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ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION 
 
 
 
THREE ESSAYS ON PUBLIC ORGANIZATIONS  
 
 
 Organizations play key roles in modern societies. The importance of 
organizations for a society requires an understanding of organizations. In order to fully 
understand public organizations, it is necessary to recognize how organizational settings 
affect subjects of organizations and organizing. Although public and private 
organizations interrelate with each other, the two types are not identical. In this 
dissertation, I attempt to describe public organizations in their own setting by discussing 
three important topics in public organization theory: (1) innovation adoption; (2) 
representative bureaucracy; and (3) decline and death of organizations. 
 
 In Chapter II, I scrutinize early adoption of innovations at the organizational level 
and explore which public organizations become early adopters in the diffusion process. 
The adoption of an innovation is directly related to the motivation to innovate. That is, 
organizations performing poorly will have a motivation to seek new solutions. I estimate 
the strength of the motivation by observing prior performance. The main finding of the 
second chapter is that performance-based motivation has a twofold impact on early 
innovation adoption: negative for organizations with low performance, but positive for 
those with very high performance. This study estimates top 3.8% as the turning point 
defining which organizations attain outstanding performance and show the positive 
relationship between performance and innovation adoption. 
 
 In Chapter III, develop a theoretical framework for predicting and explaining 
active representation in bureaucracy and test two hypotheses from the framework to test 
its validity. First, active representation requires the loss of organizational rewards. 
Second, a minority group mobilizes external support to minimize the cost of active 
representation. These findings support that active representation is a political activity in 
which bargaining between formal and informal roles occurs. In addition, I add evidence 
to the literature demonstrating that the two prerequisites – policy discretion and a critical 
mass – must be satisfied for active representation to occur. 
 
 In Chapter IV, I argue that organizational change is a result of a relationship 
between an organization and the environment. And, I suggest and advance the theory of 
organizational ecology for examining environment effect on organizational decline and 
death. The theory has been extensively studies in the business sector, so I advance the 
theory to be applicable to the public sector. First, I add political variables, such as change 
in the executive branch and the legislature, unified government, and hypothesize that (1) 
an organization established by a party other than the one in the executive branch in any 
given year will be more likely to be terminated or decline; that (2) an organization 
established by a party other than the one in the legislature in any given year will be more 
likely to be terminated or decline; and that (3) if an unfriendly party controls both the 
executive branch and the legislature, organizations established by other parties are more 
likely to be terminated or decline. Second, the effect of the economic environment on the 
life cycle of public organizations is not as straightforward and simple as their effect on 
business firms. 
 
KEYWORDS: Innovation adoption, performance-based motivation, active representation, 
Self-interest optimization, Organizational ecology, Event history analysis.  
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Chapter I 
Introduction 
 
  Organizations play key roles in modern societies. First, almost all collective 
action in modern societies takes place in an organizational context. Organizations are the 
main vehicles for action in modern society (Coleman 1974).  Second, organizations are 
not simply technical systems. A modern society identifies not only persons but also 
organizations as actors who can take actions, use resources, enter into contracts, and own 
property. The former are called private or natural actors, the latter collective actors. Thus, 
the social structure of a modern society consists of relations among collective actors as 
well as between natural and collective actors, and among natural actors. Finally, 
organizations are vital mechanisms for pursuing collective goals. In order to systemize 
united action for the achievement of collective goals and, once achieved, provide benefits 
for all members, organizations with a hierarchical structure for decision-making and 
distribution are required. Taken together, the direction and speed of social development 
depends on the dynamics of organizations (Hannan and Freeman 1989).  
 The importance of organizations for a society requires an understanding of 
organizations and attracts research interest. Organization theory had its primary origin in 
sociology. Sociologists first suggested organizations as an area of study and have 
contributed to the improvement of our understanding of organizations. However, they 
have concentrated on the development of general principles concerning administrative 
arrangements (e.g., Taylor 1911;  Fayol 1949; Gulick and Urwick 1937). Generalized 
organization theory provides valuable insights and concepts, but not all organizations 
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operate in the same context. In order to fully understand organizations, it is necessary to 
recognize how organizational settings affect subjects of organizations and organizing.  
 Despite some controversy concerning how different public organizations are from 
private ones, it is obvious that the two types are not identical (Perry and Rainey 1988; 
Wamsley and Zald 1973; Warwick 1975) and that the difference is essential (Rainey 
2003). The distinctive feature of public organizations can be found in their purpose. 
While private organizations seek to make profits from selling goods and services, public 
organizations supply socially necessary but unprofitable products that private 
counterparts avoid producing so as to prevent or deal with market failure.1 This 
difference in purpose also leads to the difference in performance measurement. The 
performance of business firms is generally assessed by how much money they have made 
or are expected to make in a market. On the other hand, public organizations are required 
to operate because of political and social justifications, such as maintaining individual 
rights and freedoms, providing public goods, and other social demands (Rainey 2003). In 
addition to complex sets of goals, expectations of the public regarding the provision of 
public services in efficient and effective way even at no (or less) cost make it difficult to 
measure performance of public organizations.  
 Some scholars object to distinguishing between public and private organizations 
by arguing that the border between the two organizational forms is blurred (Rainey 2003). 
For example, many public organizations, such as state-owned enterprises and 
government-sponsored corporations, have systems and structures similar to those of 
1 This is an average comparison between the two types of organizations. In reality, some public 
organizations exist for other reasons, which may not socially optimal, such as the US Postal 
Service.   
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business firms. Also, public and private organizations interrelate with each other. The 
former buy products from the latter for their operation or even finance the latter so that 
public services are provided by the private sector. In spite of the blurring of the two 
sectors in terms of management, there is another feature which differentiates between the 
sectors: While private organizations are formed in a market context, public organizations 
arise out of politics (Moe 1989). Relationship with and dependence on the political 
environment is another distinctive and salient feature of public organizations. For 
example, they are often controlled by their political masters (Rainey 2003; Wood and 
Waterman 1991), and their design reflects the interests, strategies, and compromises of 
those who exercise political power (Moe 1989, p. 267). Thus, if political factors are 
ignored when understanding public organizations, omitted variable bias can arise, leading 
to biased or simply incomplete understanding.  
 In this dissertation, I attempt to describe public organizations in their own setting, 
such as dependence on the political environment and serving the public interest, as well 
as in the context of a general organization theory. To put it more concretely, I discuss 
three important topics in public organization theory: (a) innovation adoption in the public 
sector; (b) representative bureaucracy; and (c) decline and death of public organizations. 
Addressing the three topics not only deals with core problems that public organizations 
encounter – performance enhancement and democratic deliberation in public 
organizations –, but it also tackles the question of which organizations avoid being 
terminated and maintain their survival.  
 Innovations in society and in organizations figure importantly in social progress 
(Rainey 2003). Public organizations have been often criticized for their low performance, 
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and the adoption of innovations (e.g., New Public Management and E-Governance) is 
suggested as a solution. Although not all innovations result in increasing performance, 
innovation adoption itself indicates that the organization realized and attempts to solve a 
problem of low performance. In Chapter II, I scrutinize early adoption of innovations at 
the organizational level and explore which public organizations become early adopters in 
the diffusion process. The diffusion model has served as the main theoretical framework 
for investigating reasons and patterns by which an innovative policy spreads (e.g., Berry 
and Berry 1990; Gilardi 2010; Gray 1973; Mintrom 1997; Mooney and Lee 1999; Shipan 
and Volden 2008). The model explains the process of innovation diffusion through one or 
more of four mechanisms: learning, competition, imitation, and coercion. However, since 
these four mechanisms assume that early adopters already exist, the diffusion model 
cannot answer the question of how innovation diffusion begins. What distinguishes early 
adopters from subsequent adopters? To find determinants of the early innovation 
adoption at the agency level, I analyze which schools first adopted the Appalachian Math 
and Science Partnership (AMSP) in Appalachian Kentucky. Because the AMSP is not a 
general public policy requiring formal legislative enactment, I can examine the effects of 
organizational characteristics as key explanatory variables.  
 The adoption of an innovation is directly related to the motivation to innovate 
(Mohr 1969). Organizations performing poorly will have a motivation to seek new 
solutions. I estimate the strength of the motivation by observing prior performance. 
Meanwhile, the motivation does not always lead to innovation adoption. Organizations 
require resources for overcoming obstacles to innovations; effective leadership and 
management provide resources for continuing on the path to innovations. I test their 
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effects on innovation adoption by using proxies: organizational size for slack resources 
and managers' characteristics for leadership and management skills. In addition, I explore 
the effects of external pressure and organizational experience on innovation adoption.  
 In Chapter III, I explore another important issue that emerges in the public sector: 
responsiveness. As mentioned already, political accountability is a distinctive feature that 
differentiates public and private organizations. As government grows and grows in order 
to deal with increasing complex demands (e.g., political equality, economic justice, and 
personal liberty), bureaucracy has increased in power. And, the rise of bureaucratic 
power places severe strains upon democratic government. The theory of representative 
bureaucracy is a normative one that describes an ideal role of bureaucracy in the 
formation of a good state. As Edmund Randolph warned at the Constitutional Convention 
in 1787 (Balinski and Young 1982), "If a fair representation of the people be not secured, 
the injustice of the Govt. shall shake to its foundation." Thus, passive representation – 
shared demographic characteristics between public administrators and the population 
their agencies serve – is a way to obtain legitimacy of governments from the public. On 
the other hand, active representation – the process of public administrators advancing the 
interests of groups with whom they share demographic origins – is related to the reason 
why governments exist. Democratic governments have an obligation to satisfy the basic 
needs of their citizenry, and have to take account the percentage of the population left 
without basic needs being met (Oppenheimer 2012). Given that increasing the welfare of 
the poorest is a way to promote social welfare and justice (Rawls 1971), active 
representation by bureaucrats who come from under-represented and discriminated 
groups is rationalized because they know best what their social groups want. Therefore, it 
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is necessary to understand minority bureaucrats as political agents who try to satisfy (or 
maximize) their social groups rather than simply being human resources of their 
organizations. To do this, I develop a framework for modeling how decisions to serve as 
active representatives within organizations are made. It rests on the basic assumption of 
public choice theory that humans are egoistic and rational utility maximizers (Buchanan 
and Tullock 1962), and recognizes that active representation may conflict with 
organizational (formal) roles. And, I test several propositions deduced from the 
framework by using data on female representation in the executive branch of the Korean 
government. Meanwhile, since testing the propositions requires evidence of active 
representation, I first empirically identify the presence of and conditions for the link 
between passive and active representation.  
 Chapter IV contains a theoretical argument suggesting that organizational ecology 
serves as a framework for analyzing the effect of the environment on organizational 
decline and death. The survival of government organizations has attracted a great deal of 
empirical attention, but most of studies fail to systemize their results and to discuss 
general theoretical implications (Adam et al. 2007). To avoid this critique, a strong theory 
with a broad conceptual framework is required. The theory of organizational ecology 
satisfies the requirement. So far, organizational ecology has only been extensively 
studied in the business sector. Even though public and private organizations share the 
majority of organizational principles, such as organizing mechanisms, assuming the 
sameness of the two types is far from the reality. Above all, ecological studies on 
business firms have generally emphasized competition with rivals in the market. They 
have rarely paid attention to other environmental factors except market control. Thus, I 
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advance the theory of organizational ecology to be applicable to the public sector. First, 
as previous literature has examined, external political control is instrumental in bringing 
about the termination of public organizations. So, I suggest several variables of political 
change and hypothesize how they affect the decline and death of public organizations. 
Second, the effect of the economic environment on the life cycle of public organizations 
is not as straightforward and simple as its effect on business firms. An economic crisis 
not only causes a reduction in revenues and an increase in the probability of termination, 
but also often provides some public organizations with the chance to grow, such as the 
expansion of structures or expenditures, because it is required that the public sector takes, 
to a lesser or greater degree, the role to cope with the market failure. In addition, I 
suggest empirical directions and methods for future studies that aim to determine the 
validity of organizational ecology in the public sector as well as in the private sector 
 Finally, in Chapter V, I not only summarize findings from each of the three essays, 
but also outline future research. For example, it is necessary to examine which 
organizations are more likely to become followers after the initiation of an innovation, 
providing a full picture of innovation diffusion in conjunction with Chapter II. The 
optimization model of active representation in Chapter III should be also investigated at 
the individual level. That is, although I examine the optimization model, I employ 
organizational-level data. So, since the model explains behavioral patterns of bureaucrats, 
it is necessary to examine the model with individual-level data. Likewise, the argument 
that the theory of organizational ecology is a relevant theoretical base for analyzing 
organizational survival and the advancement of the theory so as to be applicable to the 
public sector should be empirically checked by subsequent studies.  
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 Overall, with this dissertation, I attempt to contribute to a better understanding of 
public organizations by addressing two important issues that public organizations in a 
modern society should deal with – innovation management and representativeness to the 
public – and by suggesting and developing the theory of organizational ecology as a tool 
for analyzing the effect of the environment on organizational decline and death.  
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Chapter II 
Early Adoption of Innovations: The Effects of Performance-based Motivation and 
Organizational Characteristics on Innovation Adoption  
 
Introduction 
 Since Walker (1969) proposed in his seminal study that the diffusion of 
innovations across U.S. states is a function both of state characteristics (e.g., 
demographic and political factors) and regional patterns, diffusion models have served as 
a theoretical framework for investigating reasons and patterns by which an innovative 
policy spreads (e.g., Berry and Berry 1990; Gilardi 2010; Gray 1973; Mintrom 1997; 
Mooney and Lee 1999; Shipan and Volden 2008). However, although previous studies 
have contributed to our understanding of how innovations spread, relatively scarce 
attention has been paid to making clear why some organizations act as pioneers or early 
adopters by accepting innovations more readily than others (Walker 1969, p. 881). In 
addition, existing leader-laggard models are often criticized due to their failure to identify 
pioneering organizations (Berry and Berry 2007). Nevertheless, given that early adopters 
produce neighbor or regional effects, such as learning, competition, imitation, and 
coercion, understanding fully the process of innovation diffusion requires a study of why 
some organizations become early adopters.    
 To find determinants of the early innovation adoption at the agency level, I 
analyze which schools first adopted the Appalachian Math and Science Partnership 
(AMSP). School-level data have two advantages for this study: First, schools are the most 
common public organizations; and second, they provide a sufficient sample size due to 
the large size of their population. The goal of the partnership is to increase the academic 
 
  9 
 
achievement of students in Central Appalachia. It has been funded by the National 
Science Foundation (NSF) since 2002. Although there was no participation fee, only 
about one-third of eligible schools saw at least one of their teachers participate in the first 
year of implementation, creating an excellent test case for a theory distinguishing early 
adopters from followers.  
 Schools are the unit of analysis in this study, allowing me to focus on the 
relevance of organizational characteristics for explaining whether an organization adopts 
an innovation. Also, the AMSP is not a general public policy requiring formal legislative 
enactment, but an administrative innovation which consists of changes in organizational 
structure or in the management of personnel, finance, and physical resources (Damanpour 
and Evan 1984). Thus, political factors, such as election year, ideology, and party control, 
are expected to be less significant in the adoption decision. Instead, the effects of 
organizational characteristics are examined as key explanatory variables (Berry 1994a; 
Damanpour and Schneider 2006; Jun and Weare 2011; Moon and Norris 2005). 
 The adoption of an innovation is directly related to the motivation to innovate 
(Mohr 1969). Organizations performing poorly will have a motivation to seek new 
solutions. I estimate the strength of the motivation by observing prior performance. 
Meanwhile, the motivation does not always lead to innovation adoption. Organizations 
require resources for overcoming obstacles to innovations and effective leadership and 
management for continuing on the path to innovations. I test their effects on innovation 
adoption by using proxies: organizational size for slack resources and managers' 
characteristics for leadership and management skills. In addition, I explore the effects of 
external pressure and organizational experience on innovation adoption.  
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 The subsequent discussion proceeds as follows. In the second section, I discuss 
the theoretical background of innovation adoption. I then advance a set of hypotheses 
regarding the effects of performance-based motivation and other organizational 
characteristics on the propensity to adopt an administrative innovation. I test these 
hypotheses with school-level data on the adoption of the AMSP in Appalachian Kentucky. 
Subsequently, I present the results of data analysis and discuss the findings in the fifth 
and sixth section, respectively. Finally, I conclude with theoretical and practical 
implications for future research.  
 
Theoretical Background 
 Innovation is generally defined as a practice, process, structure, or technology that 
is new to the unit of adoption (Gray 1973, Rogers 2004; Walker 1969), and innovation 
adoption is the application (development or introduction) of an innovation for existing 
problems (Van de Ven and Rogers 1988). Organizations choose to adopt innovations or 
they are forced to do so by their overseers or clients so as to improve performance 
(Downs 1966). However, an innovation is not always welcome because a tendency to 
continue what has been done before leads to a greater or lesser degree of resistance to 
change (Downs 1969).2 Therefore, the availability of resources for overcoming resistance 
to change is a key determinant of innovation adoption. Resources include tangible assets 
(e.g., materials and financial assets) and intangible assets (e.g., information and 
knowledge). Innovations that require substantial tangible assets to be implemented tend 
2 About five centuries ago, Niccolo Machiavelli (1532) mentioned in his book, The Prince, that 
innovations provoke strong resistance by defenders who desire to hold onto the status quo and 
lack support by those who might benefit from the innovations.    
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to face more resistance and be less-readily adopted. On the other hand, positive 
information and knowledge about an innovation help organizations to convince their 
employees that an innovation will succeed and should be adopted.  
 Meanwhile, not all organizations immediately adopt a specific innovation. Even if 
an innovation is universally adopted, the timing generally differs from organization to 
organization. This variation is attributable to differences in the motivation and the ability 
to innovate. As Mohr (1969) proposes, innovation adoption is a multiplicative function of 
the motivation to innovate and the availability of resources for overcoming obstacles to 
innovation.  
 Unfortunately, most previous studies have focused on the role of resources with 
the assumption that there is no difference in the motivation to innovate. This study 
examines the effect of the motivation on innovation adoption by using organizational 
performance as a proxy for the motivation to innovate. To put it more concretely, since 
organizations adopt innovations to increase the level of performance, the motivation to 
innovate comes from consideration of current performance: dissatisfaction with the status 
quo and the desire to do a good job result in the motivation to innovate (Downs 1969). 
For instance, Stream (1999) finds that as the percent of uninsured citizens in a state 
increases, the likelihood that the state will adopt a set of health insurance reforms 
increases. Performance as a driver of the adoption of innovations should be especially 
important in the presence of yardstick competition between organizations (Besley and 
Case 1995).    
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Figure 1. Theoretical Framework for Early Innovation Adoption 
 
 
 Innovation adoption is also influenced by manager characteristics and external 
pressure. The adoption of an innovation is not an event, but a process in which doubts 
about its utility are continuously raised (Page 2005). It is up to managers to prevent their 
organization and employees from abandoning or ignoring an innovation (Damanpour and 
Schneider 2009). The ability of managers to create an organizational climate for 
innovation and to eliminate doubts is related to their characteristics such as education, job 
experience, and salary (De Vries et al. 2015; Markham et al. 1987; Mumford et al. 2000). 
Therefore, it is expected that managers' characteristics influence the adoption of 
innovations. External pressures also influence innovation adoption. Downs (1969) 
suggests that outsiders, such as overseers and clients who want an organization to 
perform better, push it to adopt innovations so as to increase performance. Finally, 
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innovation adoption is expected to be influenced by past experience of implementing a 
similar one because it is an important information source in decision-making.  
 
Drivers of the Early Adoption of Innovations 
Organizational Performance 
 Because an innovation is directly related to the motivation to innovate (Mohr 
1969, p. 114), it is assumed that early adopters have been self-motivated to find and 
accept an innovation, even though there are no competitors or role models who stimulate 
and encourage the adoption of the innovation. At the agency level, the adoption of an 
administrative innovation is a management strategy. Given that an innovation means a 
departure from existing routines and that its implementation is to improve organizational 
performance, the adoption of the innovation is determined by risk attitude and/or 
opportunity cost, which vary with the level of current organizational performance. To put 
it more directly, organizations with low performance are perceived to have inferior 
routines or outdated operating systems (Cyert and March 1963; Desai 2008), so decision-
makers seek solutions and are willing to take risk to address the shortfall (Harris and 
Bromiley 2007; Singh 1986). Also, according to prospect theory, poor performance leads 
leaders (or managers) to overestimate the expected return to adopting the solution 
(Kahneman et al. 1982). In this context, it is hypothesized that organizations with low 
performance have the tendency to overvalue the effects of an innovation and are more 
likely to adopt it. On the other hand, for organizations with high performance, the 
expected margin from the implementation of an innovation is not so large as to accept it, 
increasing the likelihood of persistence in existing routines (Hall 2007; Grossback et al. 
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2004; Levitt and March 1988). Furthermore, the opportunity cost of adopting a new 
policy is greater for them because they have performed well with existing ones. That is, 
good performance reinforces the attitude of risk-aversion to changes.  
 
Hypothesis 1: (low performance) Organizations with low performance 
are more likely to adopt an innovation at the beginning of the diffusion 
process.   
 
 In addition to the conventional wisdom that poor performance triggers the 
adoption of an innovation, there is a complementary argument. Roberts and Amit (2003) 
find that the current organizational performance is significantly influenced by the history 
of innovative activity. Introducing multiple successful innovations over time leads to 
outstanding performance, which is different from the result of a single successful 
innovation. And, adopting innovations is encoded in organizational routine with the 
confidence that a current innovation will also succeed in improving performance. 
Consequently, as opposed to the first hypothesis, outstanding performance sometimes 
may encourage risk-taking. Baum and Dahlin (2007) suggest that organizations that 
exceed pre-set performance targets tend to learn from and embrace others' knowledge and 
practices that are new for them rather than simply relying on their own existing practices. 
Thus, the following hypothesis is proposed: 
 
Hypothesis 2: (very high performance) Organizations with very high 
performance are more likely to adopt an innovation first.  
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Direct Experience  
 Organizations may learn from their prior experience, which is similar to the 
concept of learning-by-doing (Gino et al. 2010; Levitt and March 1988). Although 
obtaining knowledge from past experience is through a learning process, its use in 
decision-making is termed direct experience in this study in order to be distinguished 
from the learning mechanism of policy diffusion, which is the use of knowledge 
generated and transferred from others' experience. Direct experience is an important 
information source in the decision-making process because it provides less noisy data 
compared to indirect experience (Gino et al. 2010). It is less complicated to identify good 
and bad practices from direct experience than from indirect experience (Levitt and March 
1988).  
 Likewise, past experience of implementing a similar innovation has a significant 
influence on the likelihood of adopting a recent innovation, but the direction of the 
influence depends on the history of success and failure. Learning from success 
encourages exploitation, which reinforces existing policies and practices through single-
loop processes and pays less attention to information that does not support existing 
approaches (Scott and Vessey 2000). Thus, a successful experience with a certain past 
innovation produces an optimistic basis for implementing a similar one in the present. 
This inclination overestimates the expected return from the innovation and encourages 
risk-taking decision-making (Rogers 2003). In addition, direct experience is also 
transformed into organizational routines (Levitt and March 1988). If the previous 
innovation results in success, the organization may develop routines for adopting future 
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similar innovations as well (successful direct experience). On the contrary, an 
organization with a history of failure routinizes risk-aversion toward similar innovations 
in order not to repeat the same mistake (failed direct experience). Therefore, I 
hypothesize the following:  
 
Hypothesis 3: (successful direct experience) Experience of the success 
of similar innovations in the past will positively influence the likelihood 
of adopting an innovation.  
 
Slack Resources and Organizational Size 
 Adopting an innovation involves risk to a greater or lesser degree because it does 
not always produce a positive gain and because it requires extra resources to be 
successfully implemented (Berry 1994a; Cyert and March 1963; Moon and Norris 2005). 
Hence, organizations need slack resources – some productive capacity in reserve – to 
adopt an innovation because they enable managers to avoid transferring resources from 
existing operations to an innovation, preventing internal conflict over resource 
reallocation. Slack resources also serve as a cushion against the failure of an innovation, 
ensuring reliability of organizational performance (Hannan and Freeman 1989). For these 
reasons, slack resources can promote an ethos of risk-taking, and the proportional 
relationship between slack resources and innovation adoption is expected: the more slack 
resources an organization possesses, the less concerned it is about the adoption cost and 
the more likely it is to adopt an innovation. 
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 Slack resources include personnel, knowledge, technology, financial assets and 
others, so it is not easy to measure slack resources directly. Instead, organizational size 
has been widely used as a proxy to estimate the amount of slack resources (e.g., Berry 
1994a; Hannan and Freeman 1989; Jun and Weare 2011; Walker 1969) because large 
organizations often have more slack resources than small ones (Cyert and March 1963). 
At the same time, it should be noted that size is also positively associated with structural 
inertia that impedes innovation adoption (Downs 1969; Hannan and Freeman 1989). 
Nevertheless, this study hypothesizes a positive effect of organizational size on 
innovation adoption because the amount of slack resources is a more visible 
consideration when mangers decide whether to adopt an innovation. Structural inertia 
including resistance to change can be overcome by managers with enough resources or 
effective leadership and management.  
 
Hypothesis 4: (organizational size) Larger organizations are more 
likely than smaller ones to adopt an innovation.  
 
 Manager Characteristics  
 The implementation of an administrative innovation at the organizational level 
requires more than the decision of agency directors to adopt it. Effective leadership 
should follow so that their staff is motivated to accept and carry out the innovation 
successfully (Boyne et al. 2005; Cooper and Zmud 1990; Damanpour and Schneider 
2006). If an innovation is adopted by managers with less effective leadership, an internal 
conflict between supporters and opponents is more likely to occur. Thus, whether or not 
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managers have effective leadership and management skills should be examined to 
understand why organizations adopt (or do not adopt) an innovation. Leadership and 
management skills have been developed over time by obtaining an education or learning 
from job experience (Mumford et al. 2000; Northouse 2006). In addition, educated 
managers have a high receptivity to innovations because their greater ability to gain 
information reduces a sense of reluctance to adopt innovations. So, it is expected that 
agency directors with more education are more likely to accept innovations.   
 
Hypothesis 5: (education) A manager's education level will positively 
influence the probability of adopting an innovation.     
 
 The effect of job experience is not as straightforward as the education effect 
because of its highly positive relationship with age. Since more experienced managers 
have better knowledge and are more able to deal with critical issues that may arise during 
the adoption process, it is expected that experience has a positive effect on innovation 
adoption. To the contrary, Huber et al. (1993) find that age has a negative impact on 
personal orientation to innovation. Older managers have been socialized into existing 
systems and routines, so they will place less value on organizational changes or 
innovations than younger managers do. So there would be confounding for the effect of 
job experience on innovation adoption: its hypothesized positive effect may offset or be 
offset by the negative effect of age. Regardless of the discussion above, however, the 
following hypothesis addresses only the net effect of job experience.  
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Hypothesis 6: (job experience) The job experience of a manager has a 
positive impact on innovation adoption.      
 
 Salary influences the probability of adopting an innovation in two ways. First, 
salary has been widely used as a proxy for evaluating individuals' career success and the 
value of their competitive abilities in the market (Markham et al. 1987). Managers with 
high salaries are assumed to have a greater capability to provide effective leadership and 
monitor the adoption of innovations than those with low salaries. Second, organizations 
pay the cost of employing highly-paid managers with the expectation that their 
contribution exceeds cost and improves the status quo. This expectation leads the 
managers to be inclined to seek for an innovative policy which is to increase 
organizational performance and to distinguish them from predecessors. In short, 
managers with high salaries are more likely to implement successfully innovations and be 
well disposed to innovations. Therefore, a positive relationship of salary with innovation 
adoption is predicted.  
 
Hypothesis 7: (salary) The higher a manager's salary is, the more likely 
he or she will be to adopt an innovation.   
 
 There is no consensus among scholars as to whether gender difference in 
leadership and management skills exists and how it influences innovation adoption. 
DiTomaso and Farris (1992) find that female engineers in research and development tend 
to view themselves as less innovative than their counterparts. It is also found in the public 
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sector: female city managers perceive themselves as less entrepreneurial and more 
reluctant to innove (Fox and Schuhmann 1999). On the other hand, Rosener (1990) and 
Stelter (2002) suggest the positive effect of a transformational leadership of women on 
innovation adoption, arguing that female leaders exhibit interpersonally-oriented 
behaviors, whereas male leaders are described as directive and controlling. Furthermore, 
there are some studies finding no gender difference in the probability of adopting 
innovations (Damanpour and Schneider 2009; Sonfield et al. 2001). These conflicting 
arguments make it difficult to predict how gender difference influence innovation 
adoption. Nevertheless, this study develops the following hypothesis for the purpose of 
empirical analysis.    
 
Hypothesis 8: (gender difference) There is a gender difference in the 
tendency to adopt an innovation.      
 
Pro-innovation Bias of Superiors    
 Managers have discretion in managing their organizations so as to achieve 
organizational goals. Simultaneously, their discretion is not absolute: managers (e.g., 
chief executive officers or principals) are hired, supervised, and even fired by superiors 
(e.g., a board of directors in a company or a superintendent in a school district). Also, 
although superiors do not intervene in day-to-day activities, they provide vision and 
direction that managers and organizations follow. In the private sector, boards of 
directors are less likely than before to delegate the decision-making authority to managers, 
but actively participate in agenda-setting and information flow (Millstein and MacAvoy 
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1998). In the public sector, organizations are subject to the Law of Hierarchy: the 
activities of individual organizations are coordinated by a hierarchical authority structure. 
That is, superiors can exert authority to make their subordinate organizations adopt an 
innovation designed to increase performance (Downs 1966).  
 Drawing on the previous literature, I expect that the strategic decision of whether 
to adopt an innovation is explicitly or implicitly influenced by the perspective of a 
superior on the innovation. First, a superior's preference for a certain innovation serves as 
a managerial signaling. The signal may persuade subordinate organizations to adopt the 
innovation. Second, a superior's preference is able to mitigate the risk-aversion attitude of 
a manager by sharing responsibility for the possible failure of management resulting from 
the adoption of the innovation. Thus, I hypothesize that if a superior has a pro-innovation 
bias, then his or her subordinate organizations are more likely to adopt the innovation 
than others whose superiors have no such bias. 
 
Hypothesis 9: (pro-innovation bias) If a superior favors an innovation, 
then his or her subordinate organizations are more likely to adopt the 
innovation.  
 
Data and Variables 
The Appalachian Math and Science Partnership (AMSP) 
 The reputation of the US as a global leader in scientific discovery and new 
technological application has been challenged by the poor performance of US students on 
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international academic tests.3 This poor performance also causes a concern about the 
sustainable supply of a highly-skilled workforce in science, technology, engineering, and 
mathematics (STEM), which is vital for national prosperity and power. The Math and 
Science Partnerships (MSPs) have been implemented since 2002 in order to improve the 
performance of students in the subjects of math and science and maintain the global 
competitiveness of the US in science and technology. At the core of the project is the 
partnership between high-need school districts and the STEM faculty in institutions of 
higher education (IHEs), through which the quality of math and science teachers is 
enhanced, leading to improved student learning. The MSPs are funded by the National 
Science Foundation (NSF).  
 The widening achievement gap between rich and poor districts is less surprising. 
In reality, US students in affluent suburban school districts occupy a position at the top 
level of academic achievement in international tests (Carnoy and Rothstein 2013; 
Tienken 2013).4 The Appalachian Math and Science Partnership (AMSP) is a local MSP 
project in Central Appalachia, a region characterized by low socio-economic status and 
low student achievement. It is an externally-developed staff training program for 
3 The US is ranked low in international math and science tests. According to the 2012 Program on 
International Students Assessment (PISA), the US is ranked 26th in mathematics and 21st in 
science among OECD countries. Similarly, 3333the 2011 Trends in International Mathematics 
and Science Study (TIMSS) shows the poor performance of US students relative to those in other 
countries; 11th and 9th in 4th and 8th grade mathematics; 7th and 10th in 4th and 8th grade science.  
4 In the 2009 PISA, every country that outranked the U.S. had significantly lower percentage of 
child poverty. If controlling the influence of poverty on the test results, U.S. students positioned 
at the top level. For example, U.S. students from schools with less than 10% poverty won the 
second place in the 2009 PISA. This repeats in the 2011 TIMSS. Grade 8 students in 
Massachusetts which has about 15% child poverty are ranked 2nd and 5th in science and math, 
respectively.  
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Appalachian K-12 schools, requiring no cost of participation. In this partnership, school 
principals provide information to STEM faculty in the partner IHEs about the 
deficiencies of their math and science teachers, and then the faculty designs and delivers 
training programs to the teachers. A staff training program is a very important component 
of the personnel management to maintain or increase performance. Likewise, the 
participation in the AMSP results from a school's decision to improve the quality of their 
education service and increase organizational performance (i.e., student achievement). So, 
the unit of analysis in this study is a school.   
 The AMSP has been implemented in four states (Kentucky, Tennessee, Virginia, 
and West Virginia), but this study examines only Kentucky public elementary and 
secondary schools for two reasons: First, there is no standardized test to evaluate and 
compare student achievement across the four states; and second, Kentucky has the largest 
number of schools in the region. At the onset of the AMSP, of 74 school districts in 
Appalachian Kentucky, 30 standard and 3 independent ones entered into partnership with 
it. Only schools in the 33 partner districts were able to participate in the program. Thus, 
the risk set in this study contains the 304 schools in the 33 partner districts, which were at 
risk to adopt the AMSP at the first year of implementation.  
 Data on the eligible schools were collected from two sources: school 
characteristics including the AMSP participation from the AMSP Research, Evaluation 
and Technical Assistant (RETA) project and superintendents' and principals' 
characteristics from the Kentucky Department of Education.5  
5 The AMSP RETA project examines the effectiveness of the AMSP, where the principal 
investigator is Dr. Eugenia Toma, a professor at the University of Kentucky. The Kentucky 
Department of Education (KDE) provides data related to the state's public education system to 
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Dependent Variable  
 The first year when the AMSP started to provide training programs is 2003. 
However, the participation of schools in the project is not mandatory: only about one-
third of schools in the partner districts joined the AMSP in the first year of 
implementation. A school joining the programs in that year is considered as an early 
adopter. Thus, the dependent variable in this study is whether or not a school participated 
in the AMSP in 2003. It takes on the value of 1 if at least one teacher in a school 
participates in the AMSP and 0 otherwise. Since this dependent variable is a dummy 
variable, I employ a logit regression model to test my hypotheses.   
 
Organizational Performance   
 Organizations have multiple goals, but some of them are prioritized. In 
educational policy circles, it is generally accepted that the primary mission of schools is 
to educate children. School performance is then measured by students' levels of 
achievement on standardized tests. Kentucky has conducted an annual test (known as 
Kentucky Core Content Test) since 1998/1999. To examine the effect of organizational 
performance on early adoption of an innovation, this study employs only average math 
and science test scores of each school as performance variables because other scores are 
presumed not to be related to the decision to participate in the AMSP. Also, the scores are 
entered with a one-year lag because school performance is evaluated at the end of the 
researchers if their studies meet criteria related to KDE goals and objectives (for more details, see 
at http://education.ky.gov/research).  
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academic year and because last year's performance is generally used as a baseline for 
managerial decision-making. Furthermore, by using the one-year lagged variables, I 
tackle the possible simultaneity bias between organizational performance and innovation 
adoption. As shown in Table 1, students in Appalachian Kentucky have, on average, poor 
test scores in math and science compared to those in non-Appalachian Kentucky. But, the 
achievement gap is much more pronounced in math than in science. 
 Raw test scores are comparable only within the same level of schooling because 
students in different levels of schooling take different tests in accordance with the level of 
difficulty of their curriculum. For example, it is not reasonable to compare the math 
scores of high school students with those of elementary school students. Therefore, the 
raw scores are standardized and converted to z-scores for the comparison across all levels. 
To put it more concretely, the z-score of an elementary school is obtained by dividing the 
difference between its test score and the mean of all elementary schools by the standard 
deviation of the group. This process is also used to calculate the z-scores of middle and 
high schools.  
 
Table 1. The Achievement Gap between Appalachian and non-Appalachian Kentucky 
 Elementary Middle High 
 Math Science Math Science Math Science 
Appalachia 61.83 76.22 54.97 64.10 54.30 60.34 
Non-Appalachia 67.93 77.64 63.69 68.84 64.10 65.89 
Difference (∆) −6.10 −1.42† −8.72 −4.74 −9.80 −5.55 
†Except for this difference (p-value=0.13), all other differences are significant at the 0.001 level. 
Note: This table shows the average math and science scores of the 2002 KCCT by the two regional groups. 
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 The comprehensive performance variable is created by summing up the z-scores 
of math and science and by adding 5.08 to each summed score. In order to investigate the 
twofold effect of comprehensive performance (Hypothesis 1 and 2), a squared measure of 
comprehensive performance should be also examined. However, the summed z-scores 
have a range from –5.08 to 6.67: approximately a half of summed scores are negative and 
most of them are located close to zero. Thus, 5.08 are added to make the minimum score 
zero so that I can avoid the problem of underestimating values close to zero in the process 
of calculating a squared measure of overall performance.  
 In addition to the test score variables, this analysis includes a school's dropout rate 
because increasing the quality of education has an additional but unintended effect: it 
encourages students to stay in school via improving achievement (Allensworth 2005).6 
So, although no hypothesis regarding the effect of the dropout rate is made, it is included 
as a control variable to account for non-academic performance associated with the early 
adoption of the AMSP, through which it is allowed to examine the pure effect of the 
school's academic performance.   
 
Institutional Characteristics 
 Prior to the AMSP, there was already a federal intervention in the region to 
improve student achievement. The Appalachian Rural Systemic Initiative (ARSI) began 
6 Getting poor performance students to drop out can be a way to increase test scores in a school. 
However, a dropout rate has been also suggested as a performance measure. So, this study does 
not consider a way to drop out some students as a solution for improving performance, but a 
factor influencing the motivation to innovate. 
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in 1995 as a five-year project with NSF sponsorship.7 It had the same goal as the AMSP, 
but its method to accomplish the goal was different: while the AMSP directly provides 
professional development training programs to K-12 teachers of math and science, the 
ARSI focused on the development and support of "catalyst schools", which served as 
models for other schools in their districts to develop their own school improvement plans. 
The ARSI improved student achievement and has been evaluated as successful 
(Henderson and Royster 2000). I include a dummy variable for whether or not a school 
participated in the ARSI (participation in the ARSI) so as to investigate the effect of 
successful past experience on innovation adoption (Hypothesis 3). Organizational size 
serves as a proxy for the amount of slack resources that help an organization to adopt an 
innovation (Hypothesis 4). In this study, organizational size is estimated by the number 
of students who enroll in a school (total enrollment). 
 
  
7 Dr. Wimberley Royster, a professor of the University of Kentucky, developed much of the 
vision for the AMSP. He was also instrumental in creating the Appalachian Rural Systemic 
Initiative (ARSI).  
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Table 2. Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Measurement N Mean S.D. Min. Max. 
Dependent Variable       
Participation in the 
AMSP 
 
Dummy indicating if at least one 
teacher in a school attended an 
AMSP program in 2003 
304 
 
 
  0.34 
 
 
0.48 
 
 
0 
 
 
1 
 
 
Organizational Performance      
Performance in Math  Z-score of math test score in 2002  295 0.05 0.99 −2.45 3.19 
Performance in 
Science  
Z-score of science test score in 
2002  
297 
 
0.00 
 
1.02 
 
−2.63 
 
3.47 
 
Comprehensive 
Performance  
Adjusted sum of Z-scores of math 
and science test scores 
293 
 
5.12 
 
1.83 
 
0.00 
 
11.74 
 
Dropout 
 
Percentage of dropout students in 
2002 
304 
 
  0.83 
 
1.75 
 
0 
 
10.10 
 
Direct Experience        
Participation in the 
ARSI 
Dummy indicating if a school 
participated in the ARSI  
304 
 
  0.26 
 
0.44 
 
0 
 
1 
 
Organizational Size        
Total Enrollment  
 
Number of students enrolled in a 
school in 2003 
301 
 
423.17 
 
222.10 
 
86 
 
1362 
 
Manager Characteristics       
Principal with Rank 1 
Education 
 
Dummy indicating if a principal 
has master's degree and 30 
graduate hours or not 
293 
 
 
  0.96 
 
 
0.21 
 
 
0 
 
 
1 
 
 
Principal Experience  Years of experience at school  294  19.91 8.31 0 49 
ln(Principal Salary) 
  
Amount of money to be paid to a 
principal under a contract  
294 
 
10.69 
(44086) 
0.15 
(4544) 
8.80 
(6605) 
10.85 
(51648) 
Female Principal   
 
Dummy indicating if a principal is 
female or male   
294 
 
  0.40 
 
0.49 
 
0 
 
1 
 
Superior's Pro-innovation Bias       
Intention to Endorse 
the AMSP   
 
Difference between actual and 
predicted probabilities of 
endorsing the AMSP (%) 
304 
 
 
 34.13 
 
 
19.51 
 
 
4.96 
 
 
81.25 
 
 
Controls        
Independent District 
  
Indicator of whether a school is in 
an independent district 
304 
 
  0.03 
 
0.17 
 
0 
 
1 
 
Student-teacher Ratio 
 
Number of students per teacher in 
2003 
302 
 
 15.21 
 
2.72 
 
0 
 
21 
 
Average Years of    
Experience 
Average years of teachers'      
experience in 2003  
298 
 
12.10 
 
2.62 
 
3.4 
 
18.6 
 
ln(Spending) 
 
Amount of spending per student in 
2003 
301 
 
  8.57 
 
0.29 
 
4.73 
 
9.18 
 
Middle School  
 
Indicator of if the school is a 
middle school or not  
304 
 
  0.27 
 
0.44 
 
0 
 
1 
 
High School  
 
Indicator of if the school is a high 
school or not  
304 
 
  0.16 
 
0.37 
 
0 
 
1 
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Manager Characteristics  
 Principals are the managers in charge of individual schools. Although school 
principals represent the middle management level between the superintendents and 
teachers, they may directly and indirectly influence outcomes and are responsible for 
implementing educational policies (Bedwell et al. 2014). In the case of professional 
development programs such as the AMSP, principals can promote the participation of 
teachers by establishing a culture of professionalism or by mentoring them. In this study, 
I use demographic proxies for managerial skills and style: education, job experience, 
salary and gender (Hypothesis 5 to 8).  
 All principals have at least a Master's degree. Those who have 30 graduate hours 
beyond the Master's degree are classified as rank 1 and otherwise as rank 2. Thus, I create 
a dummy variable, principal with rank 1 education, for principals with rank 1 education. 
The second demographic variable, principal experience, is a continuous variable 
indicating how many years a principal has worked in education. Meanwhile, as 
principals' salaries vary widely and are negatively skewed, I take the natural log of 
principals’ salaries.8 Finally, I include a dummy for principals who are women.  
 
Pro-innovation Bias   
 A superintendent is a chief education officer who can recruit, train, and reward 
talented mid-level administrator (school principals) and motivate them to adopt specific 
educational reforms by providing and communicating a vision for schools improvement 
(Meier and O'Toole 2002). Of 74 superintendents from Appalachian Kentucky, only 33 
8 The skewness of principals' salaries is –7.5, meaning that it is skewed right or positively 
skewed.   
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ones endorsed it in the first year of implementation. Their decisions were strongly 
associated with their bias toward the project, which cannot be measured by their 
demographic characteristics and environmental factors demanding innovations. So, the 
residual-based estimation approach is used to measure their pro-AMSP bias: First, I run a 
logit regression of the dichotomous decision on available variables and then predict the 
probability of endorsing the AMSP; and then I calculate residual probabilities for the 33 
partner districts (intention to endorse the AMSP). The residuals are used as proxies of 
superintendents' bias toward the AMSP. For example, the predicted probability of the 
Bath County endorsing the AMSP is about 40.5%, but it actually did and has the residual 
probability of 59.5% (see Appendix A for more details).  
 The residual-based measure is uncommon and messy because it contains all other 
factors not included in the logit model such as experience of implementing similar 
innovations and their networks with other colleagues, as well as the pro-AMSP bias. 
However, it should be noted that simply omitting the variable from the analysis increases 
the inconsistency of estimates for other variables, even though it has measurement error 
(Bollen 1989). In addition, given that any relationship between a superior's pro-
innovation bias and the participation of a school in the AMSP will be attenuated by the 
measurement error (Bollen 1989; Meier and O'Toole 2002), including the latent variable 
creates a bias in favor of null findings and thereby allows a more rigorous testing of its 
effect (Hypothesis 9).  
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Control Variables  
 This study includes several control variables that are expected to influence the 
adoption of the AMSP. A dummy variable, independent district, codes 1 for schools of 
independent districts. In Appalachian Kentucky, standard school districts are organized at 
the county level, but independent districts cover urban areas rather than an entire county.9 
In other words, independent districts are located in relatively more urbanized areas, so 
this study includes the dummy variable to control for environmental effects (e.g., Boyne 
et al. 2005; Damanpour and Schneider 2009). This study also controls educational inputs, 
such as student-teacher ratio, spending per student, and average years of teachers' 
experience, which measure the quality of schools and affect student outcomes. Finally, 
students in middle and high schools study more advanced content. Thus, the motivation 
of a school to participate in training programs of the AMSP is expected to be influenced 
by the level of difficulty of classes that they provide. In order to control a school level, 
two dummy variables, middle school and high school, are included. Elementary schools 
are the base group.  
 
Analyses and Results    
 Table 3 reports the results of three models. Model 1 serves as the base model to 
test whether including the latent variable, intention to endorse the AMSP, changes results. 
It does not cause marked changes in the coefficients of other explanatory variables in 
9 In the dataset, there are three independent school districts: Jackson Independent, Pikeville 
Independent, and Corbin Independent. The former two are located in the county seats of the 
Breathitt County and the Pikeville County, respectively. The Corbin Independent serves a city 
across two counties – the Whitley County and the Knox County.  
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Model 2, and therefore, through which all hypotheses are tested. Model 3 uses the same 
independent variables as Model 2, but its dependent variable is the number of teachers 
who participated in the AMSP. The purpose of this additional analysis is not only to 
provide further evidence concerning the early adoption of the innovation, but also to 
extend discussion to issues of the innovation rate, which means the intensity of the 
adoption like "extent of use." Since the dependent variable in Model 3 is a count variable, 
I use the Poisson regression. As their likelihood ratios indicate, the three models are 
statistically significant, having a p-value of less than 0.001.   
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Table 3. Determinants of the Early Adoption and the Extent of Use of the AMSP 
10 The marginal effects of the continuous variables and the discrete change of the dummy 
variables are calculated by 𝜕Pr(𝑦=1|Χ)
𝜕𝑥𝑖
 and ∆Pr(𝑦=1|Χ)
∆𝑥𝑖
, respectively. The marginal or discrete 
changes of one unit increase in the variables are computed by keeping all variables at their means. 
11 The percent change coefficient means the percentage change in the expected count for a 𝛿 unit 
change in 𝑥𝑖, holding other variables constant. The equation for the calculation is as follows: 
100 × 𝐸(𝑦|𝑋,𝑥𝑖+𝛿)−𝑋(𝑦|𝑋,𝑥𝑖)
𝑋(𝑦|𝑋,𝑥𝑖)
= 100 × {exp�β𝑥𝑖 × 𝛿� − 1}  
 Model 1 (Logit) Model 2 (Logit) Model 3 (Poisson) 
 β β dy/dx10 β %∆11 
Organizational Performance       
Comprehensive performance −0.644 ** −0.675 ** −0.150 −0.285 * −24.8 
Comprehensive Performance Squared 0.044 ª 0.050 * 0.011 0.010 1.0 
Dropout −0.208 −0.251 −0.056 −0.166 ** −15.3 
Direct Experience       
Participation in the ARSI 0.631 * 0.486 † 0.112 0.319 ** 37.5 
Organizational Size       
Total Enrollment  0.004 *** 0.005 *** 0.001 0.003 *** 0.3 
Manager Characteristics        
Principal Education −1.211 * −1.468 ** −0.351 −0.936 *** −60.8 
Principal Experience −0.010 −0.010  −0.002 −0.031 *** −3.1 
ln(Principal Salary) −1.903 −0.923 −0.205 −0.359 −30.2 
Principal Gender (female=1) 0.203 * 0.102 0.023 0.251 * 28.6 
Superior's Pro-innovation Bias       
Intention to Endorse the AMSP    -  0.033 *** 0.007 0.022 *** 2.3 
Control Variables        
Independent District 3.305 *** 1.630 † 0.386 0.591 * 80.6 
Student-teacher Ratio  −0.104 −0.069 −0.015 0.030 3.0 
Average Years of Experience −0.007 −0.030 −0.007 −0.054 * −5.3 
ln(Spending) 0.689 0.811 0.180 1.300 *** 266.8 
Middle School 0.074 −0.046 −0.010 0.256 29.2 
High School 1.089 1.143 0.272 0.585 * 79.4 
Constant 16.716 3.960   - −7.091   - 
N 285 285  285  
LR chi-squared 60.93 75.75  182.95  
P>𝑥2 0.000 0.000  0.000  
†p < .10 (one-tailed test); *p < .10; **p < .05; ***p < .01 (two-tailed test).  
ªThe p-values of the coefficient is 0.108.    
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 In Model 2, comprehensive performance and its square are significant at the given 
levels, but have difference signs: the former has a negative sign and its absolute value is 
bigger than that of the latter. Since the second derivative of the estimated equation with 
respect to comprehensive performance is positive (𝑓 ′′(𝐶) > 0), the effect of 
comprehensive performance on the logit has a convex curve. The upper graph in Figure 2 
shows marginal effects of different levels of comprehensive performance on the adoption 
of the AMSP. The sign of the marginal effect of performance is reversed from negative to 
positive at the point of 6.77 (see Appendix B for more details). Only 16% of schools 
score 6.77 or above in the index.  
 
Figure 2. Twofold Effect of Comprehensive Performance on Innovation Adoption 
 
Estimated Equation (Model 1): 
𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑖𝑡{Pr(𝑦 = 1|𝑋} = ln �
Pr(𝑦 = 1|𝑋)
Pr(𝑦 = 0|𝑋)
� 
= 3.96 − 0.6752 ∗ 𝐶 + 0.0499 ∗ 𝐶2 + 𝑍?̂? 
     𝐶: comprehensive performance 
     𝑍: a vector of other variables 
     ?̂?: a vector of coefficients  
𝜕𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑖𝑡{Pr(𝑦 = 1|𝑋}
𝜕𝑐
= −0.6752 + 0.0998 ∗ 𝐶 
Turning Point (𝜕𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑖𝑡
𝜕𝑐
= 0): 𝐶 ≒ 6.77 
95% C.I. of the turning point (delta method): 
[4.44 , 9.09]  
Ratios of schools:  
   1) scoring 6.77 or above: 16.0% (47/293) 
   2) situated to the right side of the upper limit of  
     the confidence interval: 3.8% (11/293) 
   3) situated to the left side of the lower limit of  
     the confidence interval: 36.5% (107/293) 
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 However, like most of previous studies of innovations, this study also focuses on 
the adoption of a particular innovation within a certain population of organizations. So, 
the turning point is just a sample estimate. Instead of taking the point estimate, this study 
calculates its 95% confidence interval through which not only Hypothesis 1 and 2 are 
tested but also the findings can be generalized to other types of innovations or 
organizations. The 95% confidence interval is from 4.44 to 9.09, meaning that the 
probability of the interval containing the true turning point for the population is 95%. 
From this, it is inferred that a high value beyond the confidence interval has a positive 
impact on innovation adoption and that the upper limit is the turning point for the 
population (see Appendix C for more details). Given that only top 3.8% of schools score 
9.09 or higher, these results support Hypothesis 2, which is that very high performers are 
more likely to adopt an innovation.   
 On the other hand, 36.5% of schools are situated in the left side of the lower limit 
of the confidence interval. That is, the negative relationship of comprehensive 
performance with innovation adoption occurs in more than one third of an organizational 
population. In addition, only top 4% organizations show the positive relationship between 
comprehensive performance and innovation adoption. Thus, it can be concluded that 
most organizations, except those with very high performance, are encouraged to adopt an 
innovation by their poor performance and that Hypothesis 1 is supported.  
 Since Hypothesis 3 predicts the positive effect of direct experience on innovation 
adoption and Model 1 empirically demonstrates the relevance of the prediction, a one-
tailed test is used to analyze the significant of the variable in Model 2. The coefficient of 
participation in the ARSI is positive and significant at the one-tailed 10% level, 
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supporting Hypothesis 3. Organizations with a successful experience of implementing a 
similar innovation in the past are 11.2% more likely to adopt an innovation than those 
without direct experience, holding the other covariates at their means.12 
 The total enrollment coefficient is positive and statistically significant, supporting 
Hypothesis 4. The marginal effect of the variable suggests that holding other factors at 
the mean values, a 100 increase in the number of enrolled students (from its mean) raises 
the probability of participating in the AMSP by about 10%.13 
 Hypotheses 5–8 propose that managers' demographic characteristics are 
associated with innovation adoption. In Model 2, the coefficient of principal education is 
statistically significant but negative, which is contrary to the expectation formulated in 
Hypothesis 5. Other demographic variables – job experience, salary, and gender – are not 
significant. No support for any of the hypotheses regarding the positive effect of a 
manager's ability on innovation adoption is obtained.   
 Hypothesis 9 is strongly supported by the highly significant (at the two-tailed 0.1% 
level) and positive coefficient of Intention to Endorse the AMSP in Model 2. A 10% 
increase in a superintendent's pro-AMSP bias (i.e., the residual probability) raises the 
probability of his or her schools to participate in the AMSP by 7.4%,14 holding the other 
12 The 95% confidence interval of the marginal effect of the ARSI participation is [–5.1%, 
27.4%]. 
13 The average and the standard deviation of enrollments is 423.17 and 221.1, respectively. The 
95% confidence interval of the marginal effect of a 100 increase in total enrollment from its mean 
is [6.4%, 14.2%].   
14 The 95% confidence interval of the marginal effect of one-percent increase in the intention 
probability from its mean is [3.5%, 11.3%]. 
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independent variables at their means, and also the expected number of teacher 
participants by about 23%, ceteris paribus (Model 3). 
 
Implications and Discussion     
Twofold Effect of Organizational Performance  
 Innovation adoption is the result of a complex process of decision-making. 
Especially, at the beginning of the diffusion process when there is no neighbor or 
regional effect, the necessity and the ability of an organization to adopt an innovation are 
key determinants. First, organizational performance is a major determinant of innovation 
adoption, but its effect is not straightforward. On the one hand, low performance 
stimulates the motivation of an organization to adopt an innovation because innovations 
are basically developed to improve performance and because low performance reduces 
the opportunity cost of adopting innovations. On the other hand, organizations with very 
high performance adopt innovations more readily than others because they have 
organizational routine to generate change (i.e., adopting innovations) or tend to be open 
to innovations. Meanwhile, in Model 3, only the comprehensive performance variable is 
consistently significant and has a negative coefficient, meaning that poor performance 
causes organizations to be more engaged in an innovation. Given that it is not necessary 
for high performers to replace their existing routines with innovations regardless of their 
receptiveness to innovations, the nonsignificant coefficient of the square measure is not 
surprising. These results imply that to adopt an innovation is one thing, to use the 
innovation is another. 
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 Although its effect is not a main concern of this study, the coefficient of dropout 
is not significant in Model 2, suggesting that indirect and unintended outcome of an 
innovation do not influence the likelihood of adopting it. At the beginning of the AMSP, 
the additional effect was not noticed and discussed, so it is natural that the variable is not 
significant. Rather, it discourages the innovation rate as indicated by its significantly 
negative coefficient in Model 3. Taken together, dropout not only does not promote the 
motivation to adopt the AMSP, but even functions as an obstacle to innovation intensity.  
 
Effects of Organizational Experience and Slack Resources  
 Experience is an important source of information for organizational decision-
makers. The experience of adopting a similar and successful innovation in the past leads 
to the overestimation of the probability of a recent innovation succeeding in improving 
performance, and therefore, increases the probability of innovation adoption. In addition, 
a successful experience increases the intensity of adopting an innovation: it increases the 
expected number of teachers participating in the AMSP by 37.5%, ceteris paribus.  
 As examined in Hypothesis 4, organizational size is a significant predictor of 
adopting an innovation. Considering that organizational size is a proxy for the amount of 
slack resources, the results support the notion that the more slack resources an 
organization has, the more likely it is to adopt an administrative innovation. Similarly, 
Model 3 shows that a large organization with more slack resources is more intensely 
engaged in the AMSP. For each 100 additional students, the expected number of teachers 
participating increases by 30%, holding other variables constant.  
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Null Effects of Manager Characteristics  
  The ability of a manager, which is measured by demographic variables, 
appears not to be related to or even to hinder innovation adoption. There are two possible 
explanations for the negative sign of the principal education variable. First, it may result 
from measurement error because the variable does not fully represent individual variation 
in education but just indicates whether or not a principal has 30 graduate hours. Second, 
managers with high levels of leadership and management skills may be less dependent on 
external ideas or innovations by devising their own solutions to improve the status quo. 
Further research with more explicit methods should be carried out to clarify these 
competing arguments.  
 The coefficient of principal experience has a negative value, but is not 
statistically significant. Two possible explanations can be suggested to interpret these 
results. First, because the dataset does not contain age information for each principal, it 
cannot separately examine the effects of job experience and age. So, the positive effect of 
job experience would be offset by the negative effect of age. Second, a manager with a 
high level of job experience may devise optimal solutions by oneself without relying on 
others' solutions. Teodoro (2009) finds that professional socialization is not a key 
determinant for initiating innovations. In reality, job experience has a significantly 
negative impact on the intensity of innovation adoption (Model 3). These alternative 
explanations should be verified by further research with better data. 
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 Salary has also a nonsignficant and even negative impact.15 It implies that along 
with the previous demographic variables, the level of leadership and management skills 
of managers are not significant predictors for early adoption of innovations. In addition, 
although it is not statistically significant, the negative sign of the coefficient suggests the 
crowding-out effect of monetary incentives on the motivation to innovate. In general, 
intrinsic motivation is thought to spur creativity, flexibility, and risk-taking (Amabile, 
1996; Deci & Ryan, 1985; Dewett, 2007), so managers should be intrinsically motivated 
to adopt innovations. However, intrinsic motivation is not stimulated by financial 
incentives, but by intrinsic rewards such as prestige and self-esteem (Deci, 1972; Jordan, 
1986). Besides, given that public sector employees are more intrinsically motivated than 
private sector workers (e.g., Buelens & Van den Broeck, 2007; Georgellis, Iossa, & 
Tabvuma, 2011; Perry, 1997), it can be concluded from the results that financial 
incentives crowd out the motivation to innovate in the public sector.  
 The interpretation of the effect of gender is not entirely straightforward, as there is 
no consensus on it. On the one hand, Model 2 shows that there is no gender difference in 
the probability of adopting an innovation, rejecting Hypothesis 8. On the other hand, the 
coefficient of principal gender is significant and has a positive sign in Model 3. That is, 
regardless of whether managers make their organizations open to innovations or force 
them to consider innovations, the ability of a manager to institutionalize changes in 
routines is not characterized by gender. However, the process of implementing an 
15 Salary has been sometimes used as the proxy for the district effect. Thus, I again run the logit 
regressions with dummies for school districts in order to take account district variation in 
innovation adoption. Salary is not still a statistically significant determinant in models controlling 
the district effect, and even has a negative value.     
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innovation differs with gender. The extent to which an innovation has been infused is 
greater in organizations with female leaders than in those with male leaders. For example, 
the presence of a female leader increases the expected number of teacher participants by 
28.6 %, ceteris paribus (Model 3). These results can be explained by the difference in 
leadership style. A transformational leadership of women enhances their subordinates' 
willingness to accept an innovation more strongly and more immediately than a 
transactional leadership of their counterparts. 
 
Effect of a Superior's Pro-innovation Bias   
 A superior's pro-innovation bias increases not only the probability of innovation 
adoption, but also the extensity of the adoption. The accountability of public 
organizations to the public is generally secured by political control, which is more 
hierarchical than market control in the private sector. In line with this argument, a 
favorable climate for an innovation can be created by superiors. Also, their pro-
innovation bias can be reflected in the decisionmaking process. Stated differently, it is 
perceived as a control mechanism which limits the discretion of managers, not as an 
individual preference, in the public sector. These results imply that innovative activities 
of a public organization can be promoted by political superiors (or external management 
or hierarchical superiors) as well as internal management.  
 
Effect of Urbanization  
 Since previous studies find the positive effect of urbanization on innovation 
adoption (Aiken and Alford 1970; Damanpour and Schneider 2009) and Model 1 also 
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confirms the positive impact, the coefficient of independent district is tested through a 
one-tailed test and significant at the 10% level. Strictly speaking, schools in independent 
districts are 38.6% more likely than those in county districts to participate in the AMSP, 
holding the other variables at their means.16 In addition, being located in an independent 
district increases the expected number of teacher participants by 81%, ceteris paribus. 
Urban areas have more people per unit area, so they have more resources and higher 
density of information linkages (Fennell 1984), increasing the ability of the organizations 
to adopt innovations. However, it is too hasty to conclude that the positive effect results 
from population density. Independent districts in Kentucky are not operating across large 
geographical areas, so they are more sensitive to the demands of students and parents and 
are more likely to seek innovations to satisfy needs of the customers. That is, urban areas 
have enough resources for innovation adoption, but also a high demand for innovations. 
Collectively, these results indicate that the external environment is one of the stimuli for 
the adoption and the use of innovations. 
 Other control variables are not significant in Model 2. However, teachers' average 
job experience and schools' spending have significant coefficients in Model 3, supporting 
the negative effect of professional socialization and the positive effect of slack resources 
on the intensity of innovation adoption, respectively, as principal experience and total 
enrollment do in the same model.   
 
Performance and Innovation Intensity: Symbolic vs. Substantive Adoption  
16 Holding other variables at their means, the 95% confidence interval of the marginal effect of an 
independent district is [–12%, 89.2%] in Model 2. 
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 Model 3 shows that high schools tend to have a higher innovation rate, meaning 
that the behavior of adopting the AMSP is different depending on the school level. And 
also, the comprehensive performance is composed of two component tasks (i.e., math and 
science), so it is necessary to examine their individual effects on innovation intensity as 
well as the overall performance.  
 Table 4 presents the Poisson regression results for testing the effects of each 
component's performance on innovation intensity. Model 4 is the results for all K-12 
schools, and Model 5–7 are the results for elementary, middle, and high schools, 
respectively. First, the lack of significance of the academic performance variables in 
elementary schools may suggest that their principals are less convinced of the expected 
effect of the AMSP. The curriculum of elementary schools reflects an emphasis on basic 
skills, and the emphasis gradually shifts to the contents and the methods of inquiry 
embodied in academic disciplines as students progress through school (Doyle 1983, p. 
160). So, the AMSP, which focuses on improving teacher quality so as to increase 
student achievement, seems to be more appropriate and effective for secondary schools 
where school work becomes more advanced and technical. In addition, the achievement 
gap between Appalachian and non-Appalachian students is widening as they progress 
through school (see Table 1), so secondary schools seem to be more motivated to 
enhance the status quo. Because of these circumstances, performance variables have 
significant coefficients in the secondary-school models, not in the elementary-school 
model. In line with Model 3 and Hypothesis 1, poor performance in math and science 
increases innovation intensity in the high-school and the middle-school model, 
respectively.  
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Table 4. Poisson Results for the Effect of Each Component Task's Performance by 
School Level  
   
 Model 4 
(Total) 
Model 5 
(Elementary) 
Model 6 
(Middle) 
Model 7  
(High) 
Organizational Performance         
Performance in Math 
  
−0.164 
(−15.1) 
* 
 
−0.227 
(−20.3)   
0.261 
(2.6)  
−0.576 
(−43.8) 
* 
 
Performance in Science 
  
−0.192 
(−17.5) 
** 
 
−0.118 
(−11.1)  
−0.549 
(−42.2) 
** 
 
0.366 
(44.2)  
Dropout 
  
−0.164 
(−15.1) 
** 
 
−0.006 
(−0.6)  
0.167 
(18.1)  
−0.396 
(−32.7) 
*** 
 
Direct Experience     
Participation in the ARSI 
  
0.313 
(36.8) 
** 
 
0.261 
(29.8)  
0.101 
(10.7)  
0.807 
(0.490) 
* 
 
Organizational Size     
Total Enrollment  
  
0.003 
(0.3) 
*** 
 
0.003 
(0.3) 
*** 
 
0.003 
(0.3) 
*** 
 
0.003 
(0.3) 
*** 
 
Manager Characteristics      
Principal Education 
  
−0.923 
(−60.3) 
*** 
 
−1.033 
(−64.4) 
** 
 
−0.924 
(−60.3)  
−0.577 
(−43.8)  
Principal Experience 
  
−0.031 
(−3.0) 
*** 
 
−0.037 
(−3.6) 
** 
 
−0.008 
(−0.8)  
−0.014 
(−1.4)  
ln(Principal Salary) 
  
−0.315 
(−27.0) 
0.204 
(22.7)  
0.388 
(47.4)  
−5.720 
(−99.7) 
Principal Gender (female=1) 
  
0.262 
(29.9) 
* 
 
0.256 
(29.1)  
0.656 
(92.8) 
** 
 
−0.233 
(−20.8)  
Superior's Pro-innovation Bias     
Intention to Endorse the AMSP 
 
0.022 
(2.2) 
*** 
 
0.016 
(1.6) 
*** 
 
0.025 
(2.5) 
*** 
 
0.018 
(1.8) 
* 
 
Control Variables      
Independent District 
  
0.653 
(92.1) 
* 
 
0.799 
(122.4) 
† 
 
1.036 
(181.7) 
† 
 
0.639 
(89.5)  
Student-teacher Ratio  
  
0.027 
(2.7)  
0.014 
(1.4)  
0.023 
(2.3)  
−0.133 
(−12.4)  
Average Years of Experience 
  
−0.055 
(−5.3) 
* 
 
−0.039 
(−3.8)  
−0.041 
(−4.0)  
0.016 
(1.6)  
ln(Spending) 
  
1.340 
(281.9) 
*** 
 
0.539 
(71.4)  
1.253 
(250.1)  
1.816 
(515.0)  
Middle School 
 
0.268 
(30.8)   -  -  - 
 
  
High School 
  
0.622 
(86.2) 
** 
 -  -  - 
 
  
Constant −9.020 −7.266 −16.834 47.347 
N 285 161 77 47 
LR chi-squared 182.44 69.65 55.87 59.00 
P>𝑥2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Note: Values in parentheses indicate the percent changes in the expected count for a unit increase (%∆).   
†p < .10 (one-tailed test); *p < .10; **p < .05; ***p < .01 (two-tailed test).   
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 Second, the significant variables are different depending on the school level. In 
the elementary-school model, innovation intensity is not influenced by internal factors, 
but by external factors such as intention to endorse the AMSP and independent district 
(see Table 5). However, as the school level increases, internal factors begin to have 
significant effects. Poor performance leads secondary schools to be more intent on 
adopting the AMSP. On the other hand, external factors, which are strongly significant in 
elementary and middle schools, become weakly significant or nonsignificant in high 
schools. Compared to other school levels, a large part of the motivation of a high school 
to participate and engage in the AMSP stems from internal necessity with the expectation 
that it will improve organizational performance and from direct experience which 
convinces the success of the innovation. 
 
Table 5. Comparison of Factors Influencing the Adoption of an Innovation   
 Elementary Schools  Middle Schools High Schools 
Internal Factors    
Performance in Math × × ○ 
Performance in Science  × ○ × 
Participation in the ARSI × × ○ 
External Factors    
Intention to Endorse the AMSP ○ ○ ∆ 
Independent District ○ ○ × 
×: Having no significant influence; ○: having a significant influence as expected in the hypotheses.  
∆: Although it is still significant, the level of significance decreases.  
 
  Finally, innovation adoption and its intensity vary with the school level 
(see Table 6). For example, 58% of high schools participated in the AMSP, which is 
about two times higher than the ratios of other schools. Also, the average number of 
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teacher participants in a high school is 1.53, whereas those in an elementary and a middle 
school are 0.64 and 0.89, respectively.   
 
Table 6. Innovation Adoption and Innovation Rate by School Level    
 
Ratio of Schools  
Participating in the AMSP 
Average Number of  
Teacher Participants  
Elementary School 0.285 (0.453) 0.637 (1.226) 
Middle School 0.317 (0.468) 0.889 (1.541) 
High School 0.580 (0.499) 1.531 (2.022) 
Note 1: Values in parentheses are standard deviations. 
Note 2: The null hypothesis of no difference is rejected only when high schools are compared to 
others. There is no significant difference between elementary and middle schools in terms of 
the two indexes.  
 
 All things considered, these results suggest that the adoption of the AMSP may be 
symbolic as well as substantive. The innovation-decision process involves two types of 
adoptions: symbolic and substantive (or actual) adoption (Klonglan and Coward 1970). 
The former is the cognitive acceptance of idea component of an innovation, whereas the 
latter means the actual use of an innovation. Organizations may adopt an innovation 
symbolically in response to external pressure (Kalev et al. 2006; Meyer and Rowan 1977) 
or for the purpose of showing that they are performing and in charge (Edelman 1967; 
Hess 1998). In addition to these aims, public organizations may adopt innovations, which 
do not generate performance improvements, in search of bureaucratic self-interest such as 
budget maximization (Feller 1981; Yin 1977). In the case of the AMSP, the adoption by 
elementary schools is mainly caused by the external factors, and thus is classified as 
symbolic adoption. On the other hand, given that substantive adoption is motivated by an 
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internal desire to improve performance, high schools adopt the AMSP substantively 
because their adoption is mostly attributed to performance-based motivation. Meanwhile, 
high schools are more likely to adopt and use it than elementary or middle schools (see 
Table 6). Although details remain to be filled out by further research, substantive 
adoption seems to be positively related to the early adoption of an innovation and its 
intensity.  
 
Conclusion    
 At the initial stage of innovation diffusion, there are no role models or 
competitors who trigger the diffusion mechanisms of learning, competition, and imitation, 
which means that the existing diffusion model cannot account for the beginning of 
innovation diffusion. The main contribution of this paper is the development of the 
theoretical framework for early innovation adoption in terms of performance-based 
motivation and organizational characteristics. First, organizational performance has a 
twofold impact on early innovation adoption: negative for organizations with low 
performance, but positive for those with very high performance. This study estimates top 
3.8% as the turning point defining which organizations attain outstanding performance 
and show the positive relationship between performance and innovation adoption.  
 Second, the adoption of an innovation is positively influenced by direct 
experience, a superior's pro-innovation bias, and the amount of slack resources (or 
organizational size). A successful experience with a certain innovation convinces an 
organization of the success of a similar one in the present, increasing the propensity to 
adopt it. Meanwhile, the adoption of an innovation is an important strategic decision 
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because it requires the use of additional resources and because its failure may threaten the 
survival of the organization. So, organizations, which have abundant slack resources or 
whose superiors have a pro-innovation bias, are more likely to consider and adopt an 
innovation.  
 Finally, innovations can be adopted symbolically or substantively. Symbolic 
adoption is not related to internal necessity, but to comply with external demands or to 
pretend that organizations struggle to improve their performance. On the other hand, 
substantive adoption is caused by the motivation to improve the status quo, resulting in 
higher rates of innovation adoption and engagement.   
 This study has several limitations. First, as other policy diffusion studies, this 
study is also based on a certain innovation in a particular region (i.e., AMSP). Although I 
seek to provide more generalized findings by using a confidence interval approach for the 
turning point of the effect of performance, the sample is still organization- and context-
specific. Thus, the findings may not be fully replicable in other cases. Second, the nine 
hypotheses tested in this study are not enough to understand the early adoption. Because 
of data constraints, this study does not include several determinants which have been 
examined by previous research, such as innovation characteristics (e.g., Boyne et al. 2005; 
Damanpour and Schneider 2009) and external communication and internal bureaucratic 
politics (e.g., Damanpour and Schneider 2006; Jun and Weare 2011). Their omission may 
lead to less-clear conclusions or even a bias in the results. 
 Despite the limitations, this study contributes to a better understanding of 
innovation adoption by unpacking the process of early innovation adoption, which has 
been overlooked by previous researchers. Besides, given that the motivation to innovate 
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is the starting point for innovation adoption, the concept of performance-based 
motivation may help future researchers to design how to measure the desire to adopt 
innovations.    
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Chapter III 
Politics of Active Representation in Bureaucracy: 
The Tradeoff between Group Interest and Self-interest 
 
Introduction 
 Since Mosher (1969) subdivided the concept of representation into passive and 
active representation, the link between the two forms has been a central concern in public 
administration, guided by the belief that evidence supporting the link can provide 
practical guidance for enhancing the efficacy of a representative bureaucracy (Sowa and 
Selden 2003). An extensive literature has documented that passive representation does 
not always lead to active representation (e.g., Meier 1993; Rosenbloom and 
Featherstonhaugh 1977; Thompson 1976; Wilkins and Williams 2008) and that two 
conditions – policy discretion and critical mass – have to be met for the translation to take 
place (e.g., Henderson 1979; Hindera 1993; Meier 1993; Meier and Bohte 2001; Sowa 
and Selden 2003; Wilkins and Keiser 2006).  
 However, the previous literature has not fully taken into account organizational 
socialization, the process of being indoctrinated and taught what is important in an 
organization (Van Maanen and Schein 1979), which may conflict with socialization in a 
social group before entering the organization. Although some studies have explained 
organizational socialization as a barrier to the link between passive and active 
representation (e.g., Meier 1993; Wilkins and Williams 2008), it is an ongoing process 
after a member joins an organization. Thus, the issue should be incorporated into 
representative bureaucracy theory rather than being presented as a potential reason for 
why passive representation does not translate into active representation in an ex post 
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interpretation. In addition, the previous literature has often overlooked the human 
tendency to seek personal rewards (i.e., self-interest). Or they have implicitly assumed 
that a good thing for a social group is also beneficial for bureaucrats from the group, 
which need not be true.   
 As an effort to better understand bureaucrats' behavioral patterns to serve as active 
representatives, I build a theoretical framework in this study. It rests on the basic 
assumption of public choice theory that humans are egoistic and rational utility 
maximizers (Buchanan and Tullock 1962), and recognizes that active representation may 
conflict with organizational (formal) roles. I develop two propositions from the 
framework: (1) active representation is in a trade-off with organizational roles; and (2) 
support of external agents reduces the cost of active representation. To prove the 
propositions and the validity of the framework, I specify and test two hypotheses: (1) 
active representation requires the loss of organizational rewards; and (2) bureaucrats 
reduce the loss of organizational rewards for active representation by mobilizing external 
support. Meanwhile, since testing the two hypotheses needs evidence of active 
representation, I first empirically identify the presence of and conditions for the link 
between passive and active representation.  
 The subsequent discussion proceeds as follows. In the second section, I discuss 
the theoretical background of representative bureaucracy, especially in terms of the two 
conditions (i.e., policy discretion and a critical mass) for the link between passive and 
active representation. I then establish a framework for understanding individual decision-
making about active representation and derive two propositions and two hypotheses for 
analytical purposes. Following is a description of data used for testing the hypotheses. 
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Subsequently, I report empirical results and discuss the findings in the fifth and sixth 
section, respectively. Finally, I conclude not only with contributions and theoretical 
implications, but also limitations and issues which should be investigated in future 
research.  
 
Theoretical Background 
Representation in Bureaucracy   
 The rise of bureaucratic power often leads to the assertion that public 
administration is a fourth branch of government (e.g., Long 1952; Meier 1979; Tummala 
2003) and, at the same time, causes a concern about how to make bureaucrats 
accountable to the public and legitimize their exercise of discretion in policy formulation 
and implementation (Bradbury and Kellough 2011; Cook 2014; Krislov and Rosenbloom 
1981). The theory of representative bureaucracy offers a potential solution (Kingsley 
1944; Long 1952; Meier 1979; Van Riper 1958). The greater the demographic similarity 
– such as gender, race, ethnicity, and socioeconomic traits – between the public and a 
bureaucracy becomes, the better actions and policies of the bureaucracy are accepted by 
the public. This is because the public generally evaluates the legitimacy of the exercise of 
power by bureaucrats on the basis of the demographic similarity – symbolic 
representation (Levitan 1946; Thielemann and Stewart 1996; Theobald and Haider-
Markel 2009). This proposition is based on the assumption that bureaucrats representing 
citizens do not misuse their positions for personal gains, but act on behalf of citizens in 
policy formulation and implementation.  
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 Mosher (1968) is most often cited for his contribution to the elaboration of the 
concept of representation. He divides representation into a passive and an active form. 
Passive representation is achieved when a bureaucracy demographically mirrors the 
public. The passive form carries symbolic values that are significant for a democratic 
society, such as equality of opportunity or better access to public services (Pitkin 1967; 
Rosenbloom 1977; Thielemann and Stewart 1996). On the other hand, active 
representation denotes the situation in which bureaucrats make administrative decisions 
in favor of their social group they passively represent.  As Mosher (1968) implies, 
passive representation translates into active representation due to socialization. Members 
of a group having similar demographic backgrounds undergo a similar socialization 
process and share core attitudes, values, and beliefs (Krislov 1974), which generate social 
norms and cognitive reference.17  
 Bureaucrats providing active representation produce policy outputs on behalf of 
their social group. Furthermore, bureaucrats can indirectly produce substantive benefits 
for the represented by influencing the behavior and thoughts of other bureaucrats (Lim 
2006). For instance, Hindera and Young (1998) find in their study of the U.S. Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) that if black investigators constitute a 
prominent group (i.e., comprising the largest proportion, but not a majority of the staff) in 
an organization, then white investigators also take seriously complaints filed by black 
citizens and more agency resources are allocated on their behalf. Meier and Nicholson-
Crotty (2006) also support the indirect contribution of bureaucrats, noting that female 
17 Socialization processes do not focus on one or two characteristics, such as gender or ethnicity. 
For example, the socialization of wealthy white women from the East Coast is rather different 
than that of poor white women from Appalachia.  
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police officers can sensitize their male colleagues to gender issues and make them pay 
more attention to women’s safety.   
 
Conditions for the Link between Passive and Active Representation   
 Passive representation does not always foster active representation. The 
willingness of bureaucrats to represent their social group will continue if they obtain 
political support either within their organization or from the outside (Henderson 1979; 
Meier 1993). A major source of external political support is the presence of a leader who 
shares the same demographic backgrounds and sympathizes with active representation. 
For example, a minority leader may either explicitly or implicitly help minority 
bureaucrats to become active representatives by freeing them from the pressure to comply 
with organizational rules (Henderson 1988) and supporting their policy proposals 
benefiting the social group (Winn 1989).  
 Political support within an organization is obtained through interactions with 
other bureaucrats supporting active representation efforts (Henderson 1979; Meier 1993; 
Thompson 1976). Generally, the proportion of colleagues who share the same 
demographic backgrounds has been employed as a proxy for internal political support. 
And, some studies have found evidence of the importance and role of a critical mass in 
the linkage between passive and active representation, which is defined as the minimum 
proportion of organization personnel that a group must constitute to become active 
representatives. For instance, if a minority group in a public organization does not exceed 
a critical mass, then they cannot produce policy outputs benefiting the social group 
because their active representation is suppressed by a dominant group or organizational 
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norms. The idea of a critical mass originates in the work of Kanter (1977b) on women in 
industrial enterprises. She finds that if women make up less than 15 percent of employees, 
they suppress self-expression and just serve as ‘tokens.’ Meier (1993), who is most often 
given credit for recognizing the importance of a critical mass for active representation, 
estimates it to be between 16 to 26 percent and finds a U-shaped relationship between 
passive and active representation.18 A critical mass may also be important in the 
legislature. Dahlerup (1988) identifies 30 percent as the crucial cut-off point for gauging 
the impact of women in Scandinavian politics, but Grey (2002) finds that a critical mass 
of women in the New Zealand parliament is about 14 percent. In short, a critical mass is 
one of the prerequisites for the linkage between passive and active representation, but it is 
not a universal percentage across settings. Rather it depends on characteristics of the 
organization.  
 Finally, and most importantly, in order for active representation to take place, 
bureaucrats must have policy discretion – the authority to make a decision in policy 
formulation or implementation. Having discretion means having an opportunity to 
transform passive into active representation (Meier and Stewart 1992). However, despite 
its importance, policy discretion has been given little empirical attention because it is not 
easily measured. Meier and Bohte (2001) indirectly measure the degree of policy 
discretion that a bureaucrat has by using the span of control – the number of subordinates 
whom a superior supervises. The authors assume that an organization with large spans of 
18 Meier (1993, 407) finds that in Texas school districts, the critical mass of Latino principals to 
decrease the number of Latino students in EMR classes is 16 percent, but the critical mass to 
increase the number in gifted classes is 23 percent. In addition, the percentage of Latino 
principals to decrease punishments assigned to Latino students is 24 percent for corporal 
punishments, 26 percent for out-of-school suspensions and expulsions.  
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control has difficulty in keeping track of their employees, so generally permits them to 
exercise more discretion. Their research finds that discretion strengthens the translation 
of passive into active representation.19 Sowa and Selden (2003) measure minority 
supervisors’ perception of how much discretion they have through a mail survey, and find 
that when minority perceive themselves as possessing significant discretion, they are 
more representative of minority interests by granting more resources to minority 
applicants.  
 Wilkins and Keiser (2006) investigate the effect of policy discretion by assuming 
that while bureaucrats in senior positions have discretion, others do not. Their main 
finding is that an increase in the number of female supervisors in a child support area 
office in Missouri leads to greater child support enforcement for women. On the other 
hand, an increase in the number of female caseworkers does not result in a significant 
increase in enforcement. Smith and Fernandez (2010) also find supporting evidence that 
increased minority representation in senior executive positions in federal agencies is 
associated with an increased proportion of federal contracts awarded to small minority-
owned firms. In short, policy discretion serves as a moderator for the link between 
passive and active representation.  
 
Politics of Active Representation in Bureaucracy  
 The activity of representation as acting for others must be defined in terms of 
what the representative does and how he or she does it, or in some combination of these 
19 Each additional percent increase in minority teachers is associated with 0.24 percent increase in 
the pass rate of minority students in high-discretion organizations, but just 0.16 percent increase 
in low-discretion organizations 
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two considerations (Pitkin 1972). However, most previous literature on active 
representation has mainly been devoted to the link between passive and active 
representation by focusing on what bureaucrats do for their social group. Little effort has 
been put into understanding of how they become active representatives. In this section, I 
will argue that active representation is the result not only of an individual's behavioral 
intention but also bureaucratic politics.  
 
Organizational Socialization and Conflicts with Other Groups   
 Active representation occurs within an organization. It is implicitly taken for 
granted that bureaucrats produce policy outputs for their social group by mobilizing 
organizational resources. Thus, active representation should be understood in terms of 
organizational decision-making as well as individual intention.  
 Personnel vary in values and goals, so organizations generate numerous conflict-
controlling and consensus-making mechanisms (Downs 1967). One of them is 
organizational socialization – the process by which employees (especially newcomers) fit 
in, adjust, and conform themselves to the organization by acquiring the attitudes, 
behaviors, knowledge, and skills required to function effectively as a member of an 
organization (Feldman 1976; Krislov and Rosenbloom 1981; Van Maanen and Schein 
1979). Above all, it provides employees not only with an ordered view of the work life 
that precedes and guides experience, but also with the ground rules under which day-to-
day activities are managed, regardless of employees' previous socialization (Louis 1980; 
Shibutani 1962). In short, organizational socialization allows an organization to minimize 
the effects of employees' personal values and attitudes on decision-making and to ensure 
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that they make decisions consistent with organizational goals and values (Oberfiled 2014; 
Simon 1957).     
 Socialization in an organization often conflicts with socialization in a social group 
before becoming part of the organization, which is a fundamental and crucial assumption 
to link passive and active representation (Dolan 2002; Meier 1993; Meier and Nigro 1976; 
Rehfuss 1986; Thompson 1976). In particular, organizational socialization is ongoing 
after a member joins an organization, and it is enforced through monitoring and 
motivational factors such as rewards and punishments. Wilkins and Williams (2008) 
present a notable and paradoxical finding that as the number of black police officers 
increases, the racial disparity in vehicle stops also increases. That is, black officers have 
been exposed to organizational socialization that indoctrinates them to adapt to their 
departments and achieve organizational goals, so they represent their organizations, not 
their social group (i.e., black drivers).20  
 Meanwhile, the theory of representative bureaucracy understands an organization 
as a natural system, meaning that an organization consists of a coalition of groups with 
conflicting goals (Long 1962). Employees create informal groups within a formal 
organization, which are based on the personal characteristics and relations of the specific 
participants, and act according to not only organizational roles and norms, but also their 
own values and beliefs (Barnard 1938; Scott and Davis 2007). Active representation is 
the outcome of successful collective action by an informal group. However, as the critical 
mass theory implies, active representation by minority bureaucrats can be retarded by 
20 Simultaneously, the study of Wilkins and Williams (2008) indicates that (1) white police 
officers have racial bias (or informal norm) toward black drivers, and that (2) black police 
officers are socialized by white colleagues to take on the informal norm.     
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those in the dominant social group. Kanter (1977a; 1977b) demonstrates that women’s 
status in an organization depends on their relative number. If very few women compared 
to men are in the organization, then they are significantly marginalized and even 
subordinated to the dominant group (i.e. men), assuming stereotypically feminine traits. 
Similarly, Meier (1993) argues that if Latino principals do not achieve a critical mass in a 
school district, an increase in their proportion leads to a decrease in Latino students' 
performance.  
 Even if bureaucrats achieve a critical mass in their organizations and are able to 
represent their social group's interests in decision-making, conflicts with other informal 
groups cannot be avoided. Organizations have limited resources, so pursuing interests of 
a particular social group will generally be at the expense of another and inevitably cause 
conflicts.21 Karpowitz et al. (2015) show in their lab experiment that women's increasing 
empowerment sometimes causes men's resistance. For example, in the case of majority 
rule, female participants must make up more than half of an experimental group so as to 
have equal opportunities to speak and defend successfully their opinions in a group 
discussion with male participants. In the case of unanimity rule, although on average 
women have more opportunities to express preferences than in the case majority rule, the 
effect of large number of women is offset by the countervailing benefit that the unanimity 
21 The experiment of Karpowitz et al. (2015) consisted of three stages. First, the researchers 
randomly assigned participants to 5-person groups that varied in their gender composition (i.e., 
number of women between 0 and 5) and decision rule (unanimous vs. majority rule), generating 
12 experimental conditions (6×2). The researchers had 6-10 groups for each condition, making 64 
groups in the dataset. Second, participants of each group were brought together and discussed 
about which principle of redistribution was most just and voted to choose their group's principle 
according to the decision rule. Finally, participants returned to private computer terminals and 
answered a series of questions about the nature of the discussion and their impressions of the 
other members of the group.   
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rule imparts to a numerical minority. Women in a unanimity-rule setting have fewer 
opportunities than men in any gender composition.    
 
Self-interest versus Group interest  
 Bureaucrats are motivated by their own self-interests as well as by their formal 
organizational and informal group roles (Selznick 1948). Employees lower down in the 
hierarchy are under surveillance (or believe they are), resulting in timidity and caution 
among them (Downs 1967; Perrow 1979).22 Given that they fear criticism from superiors 
and colleagues and have tendency toward self-protective behavior (Perrow 1979), it is not 
reasonable to assume that bureaucrats propose advocating their social group's interests as 
a policy agenda at the risk of exposing themselves to conflicts with their organization or 
another informal groups. As public choice theory has suggested (e.g., Niskanen 1971), a 
bureaucrat acts as a private person and pursues their private utility at least to the same 
extent as other persons are allowed.  
 At the same time, socialization in a social group based on an individual's 
socioeconomic traits (e.g., gender, race, region, and income) encodes and shapes the 
skills, attitudes, and very sense of self that individuals bring to social interaction, 
including peer interaction and creating an informal group in an organization (Selznick 
1948; Tyler 1993). Besides, since power differences exist in an informal group (Blau 
1964; Dornbusch and Scott 1975), members' behaviors are rewarded or sanctioned by 
22 Or according to person-organization fit theory (Christensen and Wright 2011; Kristof-Brown et 
al. 2005), some of them can leave because surveillance decreases employer attractiveness and 
makes them look for outside options. As a result, those remaining under hierarchical surveillance 
tend to have two characteristics –timidity and caution.  
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informal power based on interpersonal relationships – i.e., endorsed power –, depending 
on the degree of their compliance with informal norms and orders (Scott and Davis 2007). 
In addition to interpersonal authority, an informal group creates social pressure to follow 
informal norms through mutual surveillance. That is, members in an informal group 
police one another's behavior, keeping individual behavior in conformity with the 
informal norms (Gerber et al. 2010; White et al. 2014).  
 Because formal and informal role requirements are incompatible, bureaucrats face 
a commitment dilemma or an inter-role conflict. The conformity to informal norms and 
the pursuit of a social group's interests (group interests) may conflict with organizational 
goals and cause backlash from other informal groups, which hurts the individual interests 
of bureaucrats themselves (self-interests). Bureaucrats as representatives of their social 
groups may not be able to escape a trade-off between self-interest and group interest. If 
the intention to serve as an active representative is overwhelmed by the conflicts and 
requires significant personal sacrifice, then the translation of passive into active 
representation may not appear. Consequently, in order to serve as active representatives, 
bureaucrats have to deal with conflicts within their organizations and minimize their 
personal losses. 
 
Politics of Active Representation 
 March and Simon (1958) suggest four processes of conflict resolution – problem 
solving, persuasion, bargaining, and politics. Although the processes focus on 
interpersonal or intergroup conflicts, their underlying idea is that conflicts can be 
resolved by behavioral mechanisms. Given that active representation is a certain 
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characteristic activity resulting from behavioral norms of a social group, the behavioral 
conflict resolution mechanisms can be translated into individual decision-making about 
how to balance formal and informal role expectations – i.e., minimizing personal loss 
while serving as active representatives. The former two processes assume that there are 
common goals, whereas the latter two are valid for a situation in which persistent 
differences in interests exist. Therefore, the realistic approach to resolve conflicts 
between self-interest and group interest with regard to active representation is (self) 
bargaining and politics.  
 
Figure 3. Optimization of Self-interest in Active Representation 
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and group interest through swaps and concessions. For example, as an extreme case of 
the bargaining, if an organization has overwhelming power vis-à-vis informal groups, 
then bureaucrats are given one choice – total dedication to their formal roles (i.e., 
management ideology or inactive representation) – because reward for active 
representation by informal groups never makes up for personal loss resulting from 
punishment for deviance by the organization (point A in Figure 3). On the other hand, if 
informal groups are not restrained by organizational control and enjoy absolute autonomy, 
their members totally follow informal roles and engage in rent-seeking at the expense of 
the organization or other groups (point B in Figure 3) because it is the way to maximize 
self-interest by receiving informal as well as formal rewards.  
 Just as consumers spend money to buy goods, it is assumed in Figure 3 that 
employees in an organization use their commitment in order to receive rewards from the 
organization or their informal groups. While formal organizations can compensate 
workers for their increased involvement in organizational goals through the use of 
intrinsic (e.g., praises, recognition, and relationships with colleagues) and extrinsic 
rewards (e.g., pay, promotion, and security), a set of tools that informal groups have to 
motivate members is generally based on intrinsic rewards. In other words, informal 
groups do not have personnel management authority and financial resources, but instead 
compensate conducting informal rules through the use of interpersonal resources such as 
information accessible only within the groups (Pescosolido 2001), increased status 
(Thompson 1967), and positive networking with group members (Riley and Cohn 1958). 
So, the total amount of rewards for total dedication to formal rules is bigger than that for 
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total dedication to active representation (𝑅𝐹𝑚𝑎𝑥 > 𝑅𝐼𝑚𝑎𝑥), which is attributed to the 
relatively limited ability of informal groups to reward. 
  The incompatibility between formal and informal roles causes commitment 
constraint (the line AB), on which decisions to act for a social group are made. And, 
people tend to have loss (or risk) aversion in decision-making, overweighing losses with 
respect to comparable gains (Kahneman and Tversky 1979). That is, the marginal value 
of both gains and losses is a decreasing function of their magnitude – diminishing 
sensitivity (Tversky and Kahneman 1991). As a result, although the maximum quantity of 
rewards obtainable from a formal organization exceeds that available in an informal 
group, management ideology does not always assure the highest level of value in the self-
bargaining process.    
 Because of loss aversion and diminishing sensitivity, the value (or utility) 
function shows a convex indifference curve (IC in Figure 3), meaning a diminishing 
marginal rate of substitution (MRS) between the two kinds of rewards (𝑅𝐹 and 𝑅𝐼). For 
example, organizations have to provide more rewards than personal loss resulting from 
refusal of informal roles so as to exhort an employee, who has the indifference curve in 
Figure 3 with the reference point C, to be more dedicated to formal roles (i.e., �∆𝑅𝐹𝐴� >
�∆𝑅𝐼𝐴�). On the other hand, likewise, punishment (losses) for deviance from formal roles 
at the reference point is overvalued than comparable gains for complying with informal 
roles (i.e., �∆𝑅𝐼𝐵� > �∆𝑅𝐹𝐵�). Proposition 1 summarizes this idea: 
 
Proposition 1: Active representation is in a trade-off with 
organizational roles.  
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 The political process refers to the same situation as self-bargaining, but posits that 
at least one group expands the arena of conflict so as to enlist the aid of outside forces 
(March and Simon 1958). In the bargaining process, bureaucrats are concerned about the 
degree of personal loss as the cost of active representation, which results from 
punishment (or reduced rewards) by the organization or other informal groups. If an 
informal group is able to reduce backlash from counterparts and the cost, their members 
are more likely to represent or more oriented to informal roles. That is, the marginal rate 
of substitution of active representation for formal role requirements (i.e., ∆𝑅𝐼
 𝐵
∆𝑅𝐹
 𝐵 ) decreases, 
and the shape of the indifference curve approaches 𝐼𝐶𝐼. To do that, an informal group 
seeks to mobilize the intervention of outsiders who can arbitrate or mediate conflicts with 
the organization or others in favor of the informal group. For instance, minorities at top 
leadership levels in government organizations can provide political power for minority 
bureaucrats to win the fight against organizational roles and other informal groups and 
reduce the cost of active representation (Henderson 1988; Winn 1989). Similarly, formal 
organizations can also mobilize external forces in favor of their interests, forcing 
employees to be more dedicated to formal roles (e.g., 𝐼𝐶𝐹). The effect of external support 
on active representation is described in Proposition 2:  
 
Proposition 2: Support of external agents reduces the cost of active 
representation.    
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 All things considered, active representation should be understood in the context of 
political decision-making by individuals. Bureaucrats do something for their social 
groups by compromising their formal and informal roles and by optimizing self-interests 
in the trade-off with their informal (and social) group's interests. I specify two hypotheses 
grounded in the two propositions for analytical purposes.  
 
Hypothesis 1: (self-bargaining) Active representation requires the loss 
of organizational rewards.  
Hypothesis 2: (politics) Bureaucrats reduce the loss of organizational 
rewards for active representation by mobilizing external support.  
 
Data and Variables   
Data Collection  
 To examine the political process through which active representation appears, I 
focus on female representation. Gender is the first system of social differentiation, a 
salient template for making sense of all sorts of social situations, and a social standard to 
which one can be held accountable in social relations (Ridgeway 2011). More 
specifically, this study examines female active representation in the South Korean 
government for two reasons. First, the Confucian tradition makes the difference in gender 
socialization between men and women more obvious. In a Confucian society like South 
Korea, women are still expected to be exclusively responsible for childcare and 
household work. They remain vulnerable to gender discrimination at work. Second, 
South Korea has experienced a rapid change in women's social status compared to the 
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past. For example, women's participation in the labor force has increased from 39.1 
percent in 1968 to 49.7 percent in 2011 (Statistics Korea 2011). In this context, the South 
Korean government has implemented affirmative action programs for women, whereupon 
the ratio of women in the executive branch of the Korean government has steadily 
increased from 37.1 percent in 2001 to 47.2 percent in 2010. However, although passive 
representation seems to be almost achieved,23 they still suffer from gender specific 
barriers to career progression, such as a lack of promotion to the higher civil service and 
limited access to positions in central organizations (see Figure 4).   
 
Figure 4. Proportion of Women in the Executive Branch of the Korean Government 
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Source: Ministry of Security and Public Administration (MOSPA), South Korea. 
 
 The unit of analysis in this study is an organization in the executive branch of 
Korea. The dataset covers the period from 2002 to 2007 because the Korean government 
has provided data on gender representation since 2002 and because there was a great deal 
23 the proportion of women in Korea is 49.9 percent in 2010 
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of reorganization in the executive branch in 2008 when the leadership changed. Although 
there were 40 organizations as of 2007, four of them were established or abolished during 
the period. So, the dataset creates 224 observations for analysis. To control for 
heteroskedasticity and serial correlation across time periods, I include a set of dummy 
variables for individual years.     
 
Active Representation: Women Support Fund in a President's Budget Request    
 The budget serves as a policy vehicle (Gosling 2009), so the extent of active 
representation by female bureaucrats is measured through the amount of funds that their 
organizations allocate to meeting women's needs. Taking this a bit further, the Korean 
Women's Associations United (KWAU), a coalition of Korean women's interest groups,24 
has demanded that the Korean government allocate or increase funds for eliminating the 
discrimination against women. And, they have identified and reported how much the 
government allocates to female education and employment, child birth and care, and the 
protection of women from domestic violence, sexual crimes, and pay inequality, which 
has been generally referred to as 'women support fund (WSF).' The WSF meets the three 
criteria of being a gendered policy area (Keiser et al. 2002): First, the fund directly 
benefits women as a class; second, the gender of a bureaucrat changes the client-
bureaucrat relationship regarding the fund; and finally, allocating government resources 
to women's programs is defined as a political issue in Korea. In addition, given that the 
policy preferences of budget participants typically reflect their values (Gosling 2009), the 
24 21 women’s organizations established the Korea Women’s Association United (KWAU) in 
1987. This first national coalition has consolidated women’s collective power and enhanced 
women’s rights in Korea. 
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amount of the WSF is valid to measure the level of active representation by female 
bureaucrats.  
 
Figure 5. Budgeting Process in the Executive Branch of the Korean government 
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appropriation process, a president's budget request is amended according to policy 
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agency's request. Thus, the amount of the WSF in a president's budget request is more 
adequate than that in an agency's request in order to assess active representation by 
female bureaucrats, and so I use it as the dependent variable in this study. Meanwhile, the 
currency of South Korea is the Korean Won (KRW), and the US Dollar to Korean Won 
exchange rate is about 1,100.25 So, I adjust all budget variables in this dataset by dividing 
by 110,000,000, which is worth about 100,000 US Dollars.     
 
Passive Representation and Policy Discretion    
 Three measures of passive representation are used: (1) the percentage of women 
in the higher civil service; (2) the percentage of women in subordinate positions; and (3) 
the percentage of total women. The grading system is the Korean civil service differs 
from the American system. The Korean general schedule is separated into nine grades 
and Grade 1 is the highest level. Positions classified Grade 5 or above are considered as 
the higher civil service, and bureaucrats in these positions are generally in charge of 
developing or supervising a policy (Kim 1993). Thus, it is assumed in this study that 
female bureaucrats in the higher positions have policy discretion of making resource 
allocation decisions based on their own values and preference (Rehfuss 1986; Rourke 
1984). On the other hand, positions at Grade 6 or below are categorized as subordinate, 
and those in these positions receive orders from higher officials and often should change 
their behavior according to the orders. So, the second passive representation variable is 
used as a reference variable to control the effect of not having policy discretion on active 
representation.  
25 The USD-KRW exchange rate has fluctuated significantly. This study uses the average 
exchange rate in 2015, which is about 1,100.   
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 The aim of the third variable is to find the critical mass for the translation of 
passive into active representation. However, as previously mentioned, the percentage 
necessary for the translation varies from 15 percent to 30 percent according to context 
(e.g., Dahlerup 1988; Kanter 1977b; Meier 1993). Thus, following the method suggested 
by Atkins and Wilkins (2013), I test the dependence of active representation on a critical 
mass by using representation categories. This approach has two advantages: first, it can 
examine the level of the effect of a critical mass differs across levels of passive 
representation; and second, it allows a researcher the flexibility of estimating the range of 
a critical mass, not specifying a threshold point. In this study, there are five 
representation category variables (see Table 7).  
 
Table 7. Descriptive Statistics and Correlations 
 Variables   Mean   S.D. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
 1. WSF in a budget request   204.88 1315.10             
 2. WSF in the current budget   136.58 950.46 .96            
 3. Total current budget   26702.81 58691.46 -.02 -.02           
 4. Female leader .065 .25 .52 .48 -.05          
 5. Cabinet-level organization  .47 .50 .16 .15 .29 .17         
 6. Women in the higher civil 
service (%)  
9.56 
 
10.64 
 
.60 
 
.53 
 
-.04 
 
.58 
 
.13 
        
 7. Women in subordinate 
positions (%)  
26.48 
 
16.44 
 
.31 
 
.28 
 
-.005 
 
.27 
 
.07 
 
.69 
       
 8. Women in all positions (%)  21.51 15.11 .36 .32 -.008 .33 .03 .73 .97      
 9. 0%−9% women (dummy)  .23 .42 -.08 -.07 .01 -.06 -.02 -.31 -.56 -.52     
10. 10%−19% women (dummy)    .38 .49 -.12 -.11 .04 -.10 .01 -.24 -.33 -.37 -.43    
11. 20%−29% women (dummy)  .15 .36 -.06 -.06 .02 -.06 .09 .03 .11 .07 -.23 -.33   
12. 30%−39% women (dummy) .07 .25 -.04 -.04 -.09 -.07 -.04 .02 .27 .26 -.14 -.21 -.11  
13. Over 40% women (dummy)  .17 .38 .34 .03 -.02 .30 -.05 .62 .77 .83 -.25 -.36 -.19 -.12 
Note: The correlation matrix is based on pairwise deletion.  
 
Organizational Characteristics  
 The analysis takes into account four organizational characteristics: (1) a leader's 
gender; (2) the current budget; (3) the current WSF being implemented; and (4) 
organizational type. Leaders of organizations in the executive branch of the Korean 
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government are generally filled by political appointment. Many of them are external 
appointees, and especially all female leaders have been drawn from outside the civil 
service. Given that leaders make critical decisions on organizational structure and 
functions and play a central role in personnel management (Selznick 1957), whether they 
have the same socialization experience or not is an important variable for active 
representation by bureaucrats. For example, a female leader may serve as an external 
support for active representation on behalf of women by shielding female bureaucrats 
from the punishment inflicted by the organization or their male counterparts for 
performing informal gender roles. Besides, considering the patriarchal tradition and 
gender segregation in the higher civil service in Korea, the presence of a female leader is 
a rare and precious resource that a female group tries to mobilize so as to reinforce their 
active representation. Thus, a female leader is operationalized in this study as the aid of 
outside forces which reduces the cost of active representation by female bureaucrats and 
shifts them closer to gender roles. 
 Generally speaking, the more resources an organization has, the more resources 
the organization allocates to women's programs. This occurs mainly because abundant 
resources provide organizational slack, which also allows competing informal groups to 
increase funds for their group interests without lowering that of others. As a result, 
female bureaucrats can avoid internal zero-sum conflict with others in the budgeting 
process. Moreover, as the total amount of budget increases, the proportion of the WSF 
decreases. So, active representation by female bureaucrats becomes less visible and has 
received less attention due to its small percentage. This study controls the current budget 
in order to examine the net effect of passive representation of women on the amount of 
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the WSF.  
 In addition to the current budget, this study controls the amount of the current 
WSF. As policy makers focus on the increments of change by adjusting their choices to 
the choices of prior actors (Lindblom 1959), budgeting is incremental and stable because 
budget makers accept past allocation decisions as the budgetary base (Wildavsky 1964). 
That is, the largest determinant of this year's budget is last year's (Wildavsky 1988). So, 
the amount of the WSF in a current budget is included as a control variable to remove the 
influence of budgetary incrementalism.  
 Finally, the dataset in this study is comprised of 18 cabinet-level organizations 
and 22 affiliated agencies. Cabinet-level organizations are led by cabinet officers and 
have a broad range of administrative functions including policy making and planning 
resources, whereas affiliated agencies are controlled by non-cabinet officers and deliver 
specific public services such as fire fighting, police protection, and coast guard. 
Furthermore, affiliated agencies are responsible for reporting what and how well they 
perform to the prime minister or their superior organizations. Thus, I include the dummy 
for a cabinet-level organization to account for the differences in organizational type.  
  
Analyses and Results 
Table 8 compares the results of three models which include different passive 
representation variables. Model 1 includes the comprehensive variable – Women in All 
Positions –, which does not distinguish between female bureaucrats with and those 
without policy discretion. Model 2 focuses on the effect of policy discretion on active 
representation by including two passive representation measures, Women in 
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Subordinate Positions and Women in the Higher Civil Service. Model 3 is not only to 
detect the critical mass for female active representation, but also to examine the 
simultaneous effect of the two conditions by testing the interactions between Women in 
the Higher Civil Service and the representation category variables – five dummies for 
ranges in the percentage of female bureaucrats: 0-9%; 10-19%; 20-29%; 30-39%; and 
over 40%.  
The comparison between Model 1 and 2 shows that ignoring the moderating 
role of policy discretion can lead to misleading implications: recruiting more minority 
members fosters active representation, regardless of which positions they take. Model 2 
demonstrates the importance of having policy discretion. The linear term of female 
bureaucrats in the higher civil service is positive and significant, suggesting that 
increased passive representation of female bureaucrats in positions with discretionary 
decision-making power leads to an increase in policy outputs favored by women. A 1% 
increase in the female representation in the higher civil service is associated with a 
$1.95 million increase in the WSF in a president's budget request, which is about 14.3% 
growth compared to the average of the WSF in a current budget. On the other hand, the 
relationship between the amount of funds for women's programs (WSF) and the 
percentage of female bureaucrats in subordinate positions, who are not given discretion 
in the budgeting, is negatively significant. A 1% increase in the female representation 
in subordinate positions leads to a $354 thousand decrease in the WSF in a president's 
budget request.    
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Table 8. Determinants of the Women Support Fund (WSF) in the President's Budget 
Request 
 
As mentioned already, I use the representation category variables to find a 
critical mass. However, since policy discretion is found necessary for active 
representation, a question arises as to whether the two conditions should be satisfied or 
 Model 1 Model 2  Model 3  
Passive Representation      
Women in All Positions (%) 
  
3.65 
(1.70) 
** - 
  
- 
  
Women in Subordinate Positions (%) 
 
- 
  
−3.54 
(1.89) 
* −6.95 
(2.37) 
*** 
Women in the Higher Civil Service (%) 
 
- 
  
19.53 
(3.83) 
*** −9.05 
(14.66) 
Women in the Higher Civil Service 
   × 10%−19% Women-dummy 
- 
  
- 
  
11.56 
(12.56)  
Women in the Higher Civil Service  
   × 20%−29% Women-dummy   
- 
  
- 
  
17.39 
(14.20)  
Women in the Higher Civil Service  
   × 30%−39% Women-dummy   
- 
  
- 
  
25.65 
(18.59)  
Women in the Higher Civil Service  
   × Over 40% Women-dummy  
- 
  
- 
  
32.18 
(15.25) 
** 
Incremental Budgeting     
WSF in the Current Budget 
  
1.26 
(0.03) 
*** 1.22 
(0.03) 
*** 1.19 
(0.03) 
*** 
Organizational Characteristics     
Female Leader (yes=1) 
 
395.20 
(114.66) 
*** 122.83 
(122.06)  
108.14 
(120.86)  
Cabinet-level (yes=1)  
 
27.72 
(49.45)  
8.74 
(47.04)  
41.63 
(48.17)  
Total Amount of the Current Budget  
 
−0.0001 
(0.0004)  
−0.0001 
(0.0004)  
−0.0003 
(0.0004)  
Constant 
 
−93.15 
(72.09)  
−81.39 
(71.33)  
98.67 
(94.64)  
N 220 220 220 
F value  314.34 319.72 240.54 
R²/adjusted R² 0.94/0.93 0.94/0.94 0.95/0.94 
Note: Unstandardized coefficients are given, with SEs in parentheses. Dummy variables for the time 
period are included, but not shown in this table. Levels of significance: *p < .10; **p < .05; ***p < .01. 
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at least one of them. To answer this question as well as to find a critical mass, I add 
interaction terms between the percentage of women in the higher civil service and each 
of the four representation categories. Organizations where women constitute less than 
10% of the total workforce serve as a reference group. In Model 3, the coefficient of 
Women in the Higher Civil Service is not significant, suggesting that we cannot rule out 
the effect of the critical mass even if the effect of policy discretion is controlled. Only 
the last interaction term – Women in the Higher Civil Service × Over 40% Women – 
has a positive and significant coefficient. That is, if female bureaucrats are in an 
organization where men are dominant and occupy more than 60% of workforce, then 
they do not significantly produce policy outputs for women, even if policy discretion 
are given to them.  
Additionally, the gender of a leader in and of itself is of little practical value in 
promoting active representation for women in the preferred models (Model 2 and 3). 
While not a focus of this study, the coefficient of WSF in the current budgeting has a 
positive and strongly significant value, revealing that there is an incremental increase 
in the amount of the WSF. Other two organizational characteristic variables – type and 
size – have no effect in the budgeting decision process.  
Model 4–6 in Table 9 are estimated to examine the inter-role conflict between 
organizational and gender roles. In the models, the dependent variable is the percentage 
of female bureaucrats in the higher civil service. Bureaucrats are motivated to 
maximize their own gain, such as power, income, and prestige. Of different types of 
rewards that an organization provides to employees who have done a good job in their 
organizational roles, promotion is more satisfactory than others because the range of 
 
  77 
 
variation in power, income, and prestige among different levels in the hierarchy is 
much greater than the range available at any one level (Downs 1967, 92). 
Unfortunately, the dataset in this study does not include the career path of an individual, 
so I use the percentage of women in the higher civil service as a proxy to capture 
punishments for performing gender roles by the organization or other informal groups 
(i.e., male bureaucrats).     
The main independent variable is the growth of the WSF. To put it more 
concretely, it measures how much the amount of the WSF in a president's budget 
request increases compared to that in the current budget.26 A higher value implies that 
female bureaucrats in the higher civil service act more aggressively for women in the 
budgeting decision process. In analysis, the variable is lagged one year (t-1) because it 
takes time for the organization or other informal groups to recognize and punish their 
active representation and because last year's performance is generally used as a 
baseline for managerial decision-making including reward and punishment.  
 
  
26 So, the growth of the WSF variable was calculated as follows:  
 Growth = the amount of the WSF in a budget request – the amount of the WSF in the 
current budget  
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Table 9. Determinants of the Percentage of Women in the Higher Civil Service  
 
In Model 4, the coefficient of Growth of the WSF(t-1) is negative and significant, 
meaning that if more funds were allocated to women's programs in a budget request for 
the current year, which was conducted in the previous year (t-1), the percentage of 
female bureaucrats in the higher civil service decreases. This result suggests that 
female bureaucrats are punished for their active representation through the loss of 
 Model 4 
(Whole Sample) 
Model 5a 
(Starting the WSF) 
Model 6b 
(Increasing the WSF) 
Active Representation         
Growth of the WSF(t-1) 
 
−0.0016 
(0.0003) 
*** 0.1851 
(0.8340) 
−0.0014 
(0.0003) 
*** 
External Support        
Female Leader (yes=1) 
 
2.0615 
(0.6490) 
*** 3.2610 
(0.9769) 
*** 1.0422 
(0.8904) 
Internal Support        
Women in Subordinate 
Positions  
0.0978 
(0.0248) 
*** 0.0265 
(0.0439) 
0.1383 
(0.0314) 
*** 
Control Variables        
Women in the Higher Civil 
Service(t-1) 
1.0102 
(0.0212) 
*** 0.9777 
(0.0345) 
*** 1.0608 
(0.0348) 
*** 
Women in All Positions(t-1) 
 
−0.1043 
(0.0283) 
*** −0.0246 
(0.0394) 
−0.1738 
(0.0405) 
*** 
WSF in the Current 
Budget(t-1) 
0.0001 
(0.0002) 
- 
 
 0.0000 
(0.0002) 
Cabinet-level (yes=1)  
 
−0.1647 
(0.2575) 
−0.2029 
(0.3366) 
0.2457 
(0.4495) 
Total Amount of the 
Current Budget  
0.0000001 
(0.0000020) 
0.0000006 
(0.0000026) 
0.0000025 
(0.0000031) 
Constant −0.1751 
(0.3709) 
0.2609 
(0.5116) 
−0.4706 
(0.6145) 
N 181 116 65 
F value  674.22 121.15 595.46 
R²/adjusted R² 0.98/0.98 0.93/0.92 0.99/0.99 
Note: Unstandardized coefficients are given, with SEs in parentheses. Dummy variables for the time 
period are included, but not shown in this table. Levels of significance: *p < .10; **p < .05; ***p < .01. 
a: Model 5 is run with the subsample of organizations which do not have WSF in the last year's budget. 
b: Model 6 is conducted for organizations which have WSF in the last year's budget. 
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promotion opportunities by the organization or the dominant group, supporting 
Hypothesis 1. On the other hand, the coefficients of both support variables have a 
positive sign and significant at the 1% level. A 1% increase in the percentage of female 
bureaucrats in subordinate positions (internal support) leads to 0.1% increase in the 
percentage of female bureaucrats in the higher civil service. Similarly, the presence of 
a female leader (external support) is associated with an approximately 2.1% increase in 
female bureaucrats with discretionary power and more than makes up for the 
punishment for active representation, which supports Hypothesis 2.  
In order to further examine the finding that active representation requires 
sacrifice of formal rewards, I divide the whole sample into two subsamples: One 
includes 116 organizations which did not have the WSF in the previous year (Model 5) 
and the other includes 65 ones with the WSF in the previous year (Model 6). The 
coefficient of Growth of the WSF(t-1) is no longer significant in Model 5, meaning that 
the first attempt to advocate women's interests does not result in the loss of promotion. 
However, the variable has a significant and negative coefficient in Model 6. Among the 
support variables, external support has a statistically significant and positive impact on 
starting the WSF (Model 5, β = 3.26, p < .01), but is not significant when increasing 
the fund. On the contrary, internal support is not significant in Model 5, but has a 
significantly positive impact on increasing the WSF (Model 6, β = .14, p < .01).  
 
Discussion and Implications 
Organizational socialization for new minority bureaucrats is influenced and 
even directed by a dominant group, forcing new minority bureaucrats (or any new 
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bureaucrats for that matter) to play subordinate roles. Also, minority bureaucrats in 
lower positions are marginalized and act like a member of the dominant group to get 
ahead in the organization (Kanter 1977a; 1977b). They can keep and base decisions on 
their personal values and attitudes by occupying a higher position and having policy 
discretion. In other words, policy discretion is a prerequisite for the translation of 
passive into active representation. However, if policy discretion is not given, not only 
does passive representation not correlate with active representation, but it can also hurt 
the interests of a social group, as revealed in Table 8. The moderating effect of policy 
discretion in the pathway between passive and active representation takes place when a 
critical mass is achieved. Only minority bureaucrats, who have policy discretion and 
receive enough support from their informal group, can produce policy outputs for their 
social group.  
The critical mass of female bureaucrats examined in this study is about 40%, 
which is relatively higher than found in previous research. This difference can be 
attributable to social factors in Korea. First, minority groups cooperate with each other 
and serve as a source of political support for active representation by a partner group. 
For instance, Bratton and Haynie (1999) find a reciprocal relationship between black 
and female legislators. Compared to their white male counterparts, black legislators 
introduce more women's interest measures and female legislators are more supportive 
of blacks' interests. Unlike previous studies using data sampled from an ethnically 
diverse country (e.g., Meier 1993 and Kanter 1997b from the US), this study examines 
representative bureaucracy in Korea, which is an ethnically homogenous country. Thus, 
female bureaucrats in Korea do not have other partner groups in their organization, so 
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they cannot expand the base of internal support for their active representation beyond 
their own boundaries. A higher critical mass is required for active representation by a 
minority group that has no partner group. Second, because of the Confucian tradition, 
gender discrimination is more severe in East Asian countries than in Western countries. 
According to the 2014 Global Gender Gap Report published by the World Economic 
Forum (WEF), Korea has a low gender equality (117th out of 142 countries), whereas 
the US ranks in the top 20 (Hausmann et al. 2014).27 Although details remain to be 
filled by further research, it seems that the greater the social pressure for women to 
conform to stereotypically feminine roles and patriarchal social orders, the greater 
critical mass is necessary for active representation by female bureaucrats.   
The importance of a critical mass also provides a new perspective for 
interpreting female (or minority) representation in lower levels of a hierarchy. 
Considering the pyramidal hierarchy of employees, bureaucrats in subordinate 
positions significantly contribute to achieving a critical mass. Although they cannot act 
as active representatives, female representation in the bottom of the pyramidal 
hierarchy builds a crucial foundation of internal political support for active 
representation by other in-group colleagues with discretion. On the other hand, female 
leaders, who are external appointees and not (or less) influenced by organizational 
socialization, are more committed to their formal roles at the expense of informal roles 
– active representation (see Model 2 and 3). This is because of fear of punishment by 
the president and, subsequently, because of fear of loss of self-interest, which cannot 
27 China, Japan, and South Korea in East Asia rank 87th, 104th, and 117th out of 142 countries, 
respectively. On the other hand, Canada, the United States, and the United Kingdom rank 19th, 
20th, and 26th, respectively.  
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be offset by rewards for assuming gender roles. Regardless of demographic origins, 
greater managerial accountability forces bureaucrats to accept management ideology.     
The intention to benefit a social group is not a distinct characteristic of a 
specific informal group (or minority bureaucrats), so the willingness of an informal 
group to serve as an active representative may conflict with that of another groups. 
Furthermore, informal roles to benefit a social group are often incompatible with 
formal roles to accomplish organizational goals. Thus, as indicated in Model 4, active 
representation requires the loss of organization rewards. However, the sacrifice can be 
mitigated by internal or external support. First, minority bureaucrats in subordinate 
positions protect their in-group colleagues with discretion from punishment for active 
representation as well as contribute to achieving a critical mass. Second, although not 
directly producing policy outputs for the social group, a minority leader serves as an 
external source of political support for active representation by minority bureaucrats by 
minimizing the loss of organizational rewards.  
A sacrifice of organizational rewards for active representation can be better 
understood according to the context of the observations. For example, in the case of the 
first attempt to advocate women's interest in this study (Model 5), active representation 
does not require the loss of organizational rewards. There are two explanations to 
account for this finding. First, in the social atmosphere which favors women's rights 
and interests in Korea in the early 2000s,28 no wonder women's programs were 
developed and financed, especially for organizations without the WSF. Second, the 
average amount of funds allocated to new women's programs is very low (about $3,131, 
28 The Ministry of Gender Equality and the National Human Rights Commission were established 
in 2001 to improve women's status and protect human rights, respectively.  
 
  83 
 
                                                          
see Table 10), which does not have a substantive effect on increasing women's interests. 
To sum up, because the advocacy of women's interests is socially supported and less 
intensive within an organization, female bureaucrats can produce polity outputs for 
women without the threat of punishment.  
Observations in Model 6 try to increase the WSF and show an average of a 
$22.1 million increase in the process of making a budget request (see Table 10). Unlike 
the symbolic act of starting new but small women's programs, representing substantive 
interests of women is punished, decreasing the percentage of female bureaucrats in the 
higher civil service in the following year. In short, active representation is punished in 
these organizations.  
 
Table 10. Growth of WSF and Female Bureaucrats with Discretionary Power     
 
Average Increase in the WSF in a 
President's Budget Requesta 
Average Percentage of Female 
Bureaucrats in the Higher Civil Service 
Organizations without the WSF 
in the previous year (Model 5) 
$0.03 (0.30) 8.14% (6.95) 
Organizations with the WSF in 
the previous year (Model 6) 
$221.34 (857.61) 13.96% (14.89) 
Note: Standard deviations are in parentheses. The null hypothesis of no difference is rejected for all comparisons.  
a: One unit is worth approximately $100,000.  
 
The effects of the two support variables also vary with the context of active 
representation. Internal support from minority bureaucrats in subordinate positions 
offsets the loss of organizational rewards only in cases of weak active representation. 
For example, in Model 5, a one-standard-deviation increase in female bureaucrats in 
subordinate positions raises the percentage of female bureaucrats in the higher civil 
service by 2.67%, which overcomes the negative impact of a one-standard-deviation 
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increase in the WSF in the lagged year (−1.23%). On the contrary, the positive effect of 
external support (i.e., female leader) disappears in Model 6. Minority leaders cannot 
totally deviate from management ideology and responsibilities, and have to keep a 
balance among different tasks. Encouraging employees to devote organizational roles 
and controlling conflicts within organizations are duties of top leaders.  
 
Conclusion  
The theory of representative bureaucracy is a normative one that describes an 
ideal role of bureaucracy in the formation of a good state. As Edmund Randolph 
warned at the Constitutional Convention in 1787 (Balinski and Young 1982), "If a fair 
representation of the people be not secured, the injustice of the Govt. shall shake to its 
foundation." Thus, passive representation in bureaucracy itself is a way to obtain 
legitimacy of governments from the public. And also, active representation is related to 
the reason why governments exist. Democratic governments have an obligation to 
satisfy the basic needs of their citizenry, and have to take account the percentage of the 
population left without basic needs being met (Oppenheimer 2012). Given that 
increasing the welfare of the poorest is a way to promote social welfare and justice 
(Rawls 1971), active representation by bureaucrats who come from under-represented 
and discriminated groups is rationalized because they know best what their social 
groups want. Therefore, it is necessary to understand minority bureaucrats as political 
agents who try to satisfy (or maximize) their social groups as well as human resources 
of their organizations.  
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This study contributes to the literature on representative bureaucracy by 
providing a framework for modeling how decisions to serve active representatives 
within organizations are made. It is grounded on the assumptions that bureaucrats are 
self-interested (Downs 1967; Niskanen 1971) and that there is inter-role conflict 
between organizational (formal) and minority (informal) roles. Bureaucrats find the 
optimal point at which self-interest is maximized in the conflict. For example, if an 
organization has a powerful reward/punishment system and a minority group cannot 
compensate the punishment or the loss of organizational rewards, then minority 
bureaucrats are not willing to carry out minority roles. This study indicates that the 
framework is acceptable by proving two propositions drawn from it: Active 
representation is in a trade-off with organizational roles (Proposition1), but support of 
external agents reduces the cost of active representation (Proposition 2).  
In addition, this study adds evidence to the literature demonstrating that the 
two prerequisites – policy discretion and a critical mass – must be satisfied for active 
representation to occur. It is also found that the size of a critical mass depends on the 
context. A larger size of a critical mass is necessary if a minority group has no partner 
groups and cannot expand the base of internal support for their active representation 
and/or if the culture of a society is less concerned about diversity and minority rights. 
For example, I show that because of the two reasons, women in the Korean 
bureaucracy need a critical mass of about 40% for their active representation.    
Clearly, this study also has a number of limitations. First, and most 
importantly, I cannot examine the proposition that informal groups compensate their 
members for performing informal roles because of data constraints. This proposition is 
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another critical element of the framework of self-interest. Second, the framework 
describes active representation as an individual's decision, but the empirical analysis 
has been carried out using organizational-level data. Although it is commonly done in 
the literature and not a statistical issue, this study commits a fallacy of division. Thus, 
it should be noted that individuals have different levels of reward motivation and 
socialization pressure for active representation and that the intensity of active 
representation depends on individual characteristics.  
The framework developed in this study calls for additional research on whether 
and how it is relevant and appropriate to explain decision-making for active 
representation. Also, besides the two propositions proved here, the framework contains 
various propositions about the politics of active representation, which need empirical 
evidence. My hope is that this study will provide 'food for thought' to representative 
bureaucracy theorists and the framework will be investigated and verified by future 
research.  
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Chapter IV 
Ecology of Government:  
The Dynamics of Organizational Decline and Death  
 
Introduction 
 The survival of government organizations has attracted a great deal of empirical 
attention (Adam et al. 2007; Boin et al. 2010; James et al. 2015; Kaufman 1976; Lewis 
2002; Peter and Hogwood 1988). A government as a whole cannot be replaced by 
business or nonprofit organizations and has generally expanded, but its subunits (e.g., 
departments or ministries in an executive branch) are not immortal. Their roles and 
functions are transferable to others in the government (Lewis 2002). However, 
organizational structure to perform certain policies indicates the degree to which they 
receive attention and support from politicians and the public because structural choices 
have important consequences for whether and how the policies turn into outcomes (James 
et al. 2015; McCubbins et al. 1989; Moe 1989). Especially, organizational decline or 
death has two important implications. First, if functions of an organization are no longer 
considered important, the organization will be terminated and its functions will be 
transferred to others or less resources will be allocated and the organization will decline. 
Second, changes in organizational structure have been used as a performance measure 
(Carroll and Swaminathan 1992).29 Therefore, the survival of an organization means that 
it has performed well historically. For instance, the cessation of the United State 
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) is a classic example of replacing a poorly-
29 Carroll and Swaminathan (1992) suggest six reasons why failure and mortality of an organization 
deserve consideration as a performance measure.  
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performing organization with new ones. The agency was widely seen as ineffective, 
particularly after the September 11 attacks (9/11) in 2001 (U.S. Department of Justice 
2002). Thus, eventually, the functions of the INS were transferred to three agencies by 
the Homeland Security Act of 2002: (1) immigration services to the U.S. Citizenship and 
Immigration Services (USCIS); (2) investigation and deportation to the U.S. Immigration 
and Customs Enforcement (USICE); and (3) border functions to the U.S. Customs and 
Border Protection (USCBP).  
 Defining an organization is a first and fundamental step before studying 
organizational change. The concept of an 'organization' is not universally defined, and 
three contrasting definitions have arisen in terms of which features of an organization are 
emphasized: rational, natural, and open system. In the first definition, organizations are 
viewed as highly formalized collectivities to achieve specific goals. The second definition 
focuses attention on the behavior of members of an organization and perceives 
organizations as social systems in which participants not only pursue multiple interests, 
but also recognize the value of perpetuating their organizations as an important resource. 
The closed system view of the two previous definitions has been challenged since the 
1960s by the open system view, which takes account of the effect of the environment on 
organizations. So, the third perspective defines organizations as activities involving 
coalitions of participants with varying interests embedded in wider environments (Scott 
and Davis 2007).   
 This study discusses the decline and death of government organizations based on 
the open system perspective because relationship with and dependence on the political 
environment is a distinctive and salient feature of public organizations. For example, they 
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are often controlled by their political masters (Rainey 2003; Wood and Waterman 1991). 
In other words, interaction with the environment is essential for them to function and 
survive, which is the focus of the open-system view. Of several open-system theories, I 
use organizational ecology as a theoretical base for three reasons. First, political control 
of public organizations implies the importance of environmental effects on public 
organizations. Second, the importance of the environment can hardly be more strongly 
underlined than it is in organizational ecology (Scott and Davis 2007). Third and finally, 
given that all organizations have inherent tendencies to expand (Downs 1966; Parkinson 
1957), decline or death cannot be a strategy that organizations employ for adapting to 
varying environment. Thus, some open-system theories focusing on response and 
adaptation of organizations to environmental changes (e.g., structural contingency theory) 
are not given consideration in this study. Consequentially, organizational ecology is 
appropriate for exploring environmental effects on organizational decline and death. 
 However, it should be noted that public organizations are somewhat different 
from private ones (Perry and Rainey 1988; Wamsley and Zald 1973; Warwick 1975). For 
example, while the survival of business firms is generally determined by their 
performance in the market, public organizations are required to operate because of 
political and social justifications, such as maintaining individual rights and freedoms, 
providing public goods, and meeting other social demands (Rainey 2003). So, as previous 
studies have pointed out (e.g., James et al. 2015; Lewis 2002; Moe 1989; Park 2013; 
Robinson 2004), it is undoubtedly important to consider political factors as critical causes 
of the survival of public organizations. However, on the other hand, public and private 
organizations both have some common features and are subject to a common set of rules, 
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so they can be organized according to the same principles (Christensen et al. 2007). That 
is, the survival of public organizations should be also investigated from the viewpoint of 
organization theory as well as that of politics. 
 The subsequent discussion proceeds as follows. In the following section, I 
describe organizational ecology as a guiding theory for understanding environmental 
effects on organizational decline and death in the public sector. I then advance a set of 
hypotheses concerning organizations decline or death on the basis of not only 
propositions of organizational ecology but also findings of previous studies which 
recognize political and economic effects on structural change of a public organization. 
This complementary process is necessary in order to enhance the theoretical fitness of 
organizational ecology for the public sector. In the fourth section, I outline research 
designs and methods to test the hypotheses. Finally, I conclude with a brief summary and 
with reasons why an open-system approach is required to deepen understanding of public 
organizations.  
 
Organizational Ecology 
Natural Selection of Organizations  
 Most ecology studies have been conducted at the population level, through which 
organizational ecologists can explore the nature of the larger system of relations in which 
an organization is but one player among many and the evolutionary mechanism of 
organizations (Scott and Davis 2007). Thus, the terms of 'organizational ecology' and 
'population ecology' are often used interchangeably (e.g., Hannan and Freeman 1989).  
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 As described briefly in the previous section, organizational ecology is an 
alternative paradigm within organization theory in the way that it is distinct from existing 
theories with an emphasis on rational adjustment of structure by individual organizations 
to the situation (Donaldson 1995). It has paid attention to the effect of the environment on 
organizational changes. To put it more concretely, an organization adjusts to external 
conditions through birth-and-death process of natural selection (Baum and Amburgey 
2002; Donaldson 1995; Hannan and Freeman 1989), and the process is an important 
source of diversity of organizations in a population. And also, non-vital changes, such as 
growth and decline in organizational structure, serve as another source of organizational 
diversity through the addition of new forms to a population or the influence on vital 
changes.  
 Natural selection of organizations arises through three stages: variation, selection, 
and retention. While in organic evolution, variations occur through the genetic mutation 
process, organizational variation comes about due to different responses of organizations 
to external stimuli according to their own characteristics such as experience, culture, and 
capacity (Baum and Amburgey 2002). Selection mechanism constitutes the central pillar 
of organizational ecology, arguing that the environment differentially selects or 
eliminates some organizations on the basis of the fit between organizational structure and 
environmental characteristics (Aldrich and Pfeffer 1976). The final stage involves the 
operation of a retention mechanism, through which certain organizational variations 
selected by the environment in the previous stage are preserved, duplicated, or 
reproduced. However, it should be noted that the retention phase is not stable. 
Organizations are continuously exposed to external stimuli and the diffusion of the 
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variations increases the degree of competition for resources in the population (Baum and 
Amburgey 2002), which triggers another process of natural selection process.  
 
Niche Theory of Fitness 
 As organizational ecology states, organizations have to maintain the state of being 
fit for the environment in order to survive. Organizational fitness is determined by the 
niche that an organization occupies. The niche was first mooted by bio-ecology and is 
defined as the set of environmental conditions within which a species can reproduce itself. 
In organization theory, the organizational niche includes not only a set of social, 
economic, and political conditions and forces affecting the life and development of an 
organization, but also relationships that the organization intentionally or unintentionally 
has, which serves as the base of organizational activities for survival. Since organizations 
have their own niches, the environment may provide some organizations with favorable 
conditions for reproduction and growth, but the others with severe survival conditions.  
 As shown in Figure 5, the niche indicates a range of conditions, which is named 
as niche width. And, there is a variance in the level of prosperity in the niche width. For 
example, organization A can survive in their niche width from E1 to E2, but prosper in the 
environment of E'. However, it should be noted that residence in the niche does not 
always guarantee the survival of the organization. The niche width causes natural 
selection by competition. Organizations whose niches overlap will compete for limited 
resources, and some of them can occupy no portion of the niche. The environment 
excludes the defeated out of the population.  
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Figure 6. Hypothetical Fitness Functions 
 
  Source: Hannan and Freeman (1989, p. 99, Figure 5.1) 
   
 An organization with a broad niche width (e.g., organization B in Figure 6) has 
considerable plasticity in resource use. However, at the same time, the broader the niche 
of an organization, the more likely the organization competes with other rivals. From this 
dilemma, two organizational strategies for survival have been developed: 'specialist,' 
occupying a very narrow band of environmental variation but maximizing its exploitation 
of the environment versus 'generalist,' accepting a lower level of exploitation in return for 
the capacity to survive under diverse environmental conditions (Freeman and Hannan 
1983; Hannan and Freeman 1977; Scott and Davis 2007). Generalist organizations hold 
some productive capacity in reserve (i.e., organizational slack) to cope with future 
environmental fluctuations, whereas specialist organizations commit most of their 
resources to maximize organizational fitness for the current environment.  
 Competitive advantages of the two organizational strategies are determined on the 
basis of environmental variation. Organizational ecology addresses two dimensions of 
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environmental variation: variability and grain (Freeman and Hannan 1983). The former 
refers to the variance in environmental fluctuation about their mean, and the latter refers 
to the length of typical periodicities. In the environment with low variability, while 
organizational slack of generalists is of no use at all, specialist organizations can 
maximize efficiency and effectiveness in achieving their objectives. Thus, specialism is 
the optimal strategy in environments with low variability. Meanwhile, if variations occur 
frequently and their typical durations are long relative to the lifetime of an organization, 
then the environment is said to be coarse-grained. In contrast, a particular environmental 
fluctuation only exists for a brief period, which is termed as fine-grain. In coarse-grained 
environments, generalist organizations are selected for survival because by using their 
organizational slack, they are able to withstand and sustain longer periods of 
environmental variations. However, in fine-grained environments, organizational slack 
does not provide any evolutionary advantages because buffering against a short period of 
environmental fluctuations does not need a large amount of reserve capacity. Thus, 
generalist organizations appear inefficient due to the waste of resources and specialism 
emerges as the optimal strategy in fine-grained environments.  
 
Structural Inertia Theory of Environmental Determinism   
 Organizational ecology argues that the environment determines the survival of 
organizations. However, it does not necessarily mean that organizations never try to 
transform their structures. They respond to threats and opportunities in the environment, 
but not quickly enough so that their adaptations do not enhance the chance of survival, 
and natural selection replaces adaptation as the vehicle of change (Astley and Van de Ven 
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1983; Betton and Dess 1985; Hannan and Freeman 1989). The lack of capability to 
balance the speed of organizational response with the temporal patterns of relevant 
environments is due to structural inertia, which is defined as the tendency to resist 
changes and maintain a state of rest. A high level of inertia increases the gap between 
availability and requirement of adaptation strategy of an organization in changing 
environments. 
 Structural inertia results from both internal and external factors (Hannan and 
Freeman 1977, 1989). Constraints arising from internal considerations are 1) sunk costs, 
2) imperfect information, 3) internal politics, and 4) organizational histories. First, 
decision-making in organizations is strongly subject to previous decisions, especially 
concerning investments in specific assets which are not easily transferable to other tasks 
and functions – sunk costs. Second, rational adaptation stems from the assumption of 
perfect information. In reality, however, organizations rarely receive full information 
with respect to the risk of changing environments. Although they employ strategic 
planning for imperfect-information situations, it should be noted that strategic planning is 
based on what they think will happen. Consequently, organizations are less likely to 
recognize the necessity of reorganization, so adaptation to environmental changes is slow 
and incomplete. Third, adaptation is followed by redistribution of resources, which may 
bring about conflicts among subunits and resistance by those who lose thereby. Finally, it 
is costly to change standardized work procedures and authority allocation processes. 
Organizations with long histories of operations tend to have normative agreement on 
functions and resource distribution, so any attempt to change organizational structures 
require huge amount of time and energy, confronting structural inertia.   
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 Structural inertia is also derived from external pressures. First, as legal and fiscal 
barriers to entry and exit do in the business sector (Hannan and Freeman 1984), legal 
procedures and time requirements to reorganize a government serve as a source of 
structural inertia. For example, public organizations are established by law, and they are 
not allowed to arbitrarily end their services. As a result, these barriers raise the tendency 
to maintain the status quo by increasing the cost of change. Second, the problem of 
imperfect information has been worsened in turbulent environments. So, the tendency to 
draw on organizational histories becomes more conspicuous. Finally, changes in 
organizational structure by adaption may threaten current organizational legitimacy, 
resulting in the loss of institutional support and resources which had been granted. 
Legitimacy threat makes organizations hesitate to adjust themselves to new 
environmental conditions.  
 Structural inertial serves as a criterion for the environment to decide which 
organizations survive as well as a reason why adaption cannot become a strategy for 
survival. In population ecology, organizational competence is composed of two 
properties: reliability and accountability (Amburgey et al. 1993; Hannan and Freeman 
1984, 1989). Reliability is the capacity to produce outputs with low variance in quality in 
a timely manner. Accountability is defined as holding organizations to account for their 
actions. Organizations with low reliability and accountability are considered as 
incompetent, and less likely to be selected by the environment for survival. High level of 
reliability and accountability are achieved through processes of institutionalization and by 
creating organizational routines (Hannan and Freeman 1984). First, institutionalization 
lowers the cost of organizing collective action by inducing members to take accepting 
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organizational goals and strategies, and authority relations for granted. Second, 
organizational routines are defined as repetitive and recognizable patterns of collective 
actions such as military drills (Nelson and Winter 1982). By formulating and 
remembering a means by which to accomplish goals and missions, organization can 
produce reliable and accountable performance.  
 The two solutions that provide advantage of competence in natural selection 
imply that surviving organizations had successfully resisted environmental changes. In 
other words, inertia is a by-product of selection. High competence is accompanied by 
strong structural inertia, and natural selection favors organizations whose structures have 
high inertia (Hannan and Freeman 1989). Individual organizations are characterized by 
different degrees of structural inertia, and the strength of inertial forces varies with age, 
size, and complexity of an organization. Thus, structural inertia theory argues that the 
survival of organizations is influenced by not only environmental factors, but also their 
demographic characteristics.   
 
Determinants of Organizational Decline and Death 
 Organizational ecology and related studies have focused on business firms and 
paid little attention to characteristics of public organizations. For example, political 
control is a distinctive characteristic of the public sector. Thus, I develop a set of 
hypotheses regarding determinants of the decline and death of public organizations by 
adjusting the theory of organizational ecology to the public sector and by introducing 
political factors which have been found to influence the mortality rate of public 
organizations.  
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Niche: Density Dependence and Environmental Conditions     
 The environment of each organization is mainly composed of other organizations, 
from which the density development model was derived. Density is technically defined as 
the number of organizations or the sum of the sizes of all organizations in the population. 
Niche overlap does neither necessarily lead to competition for scarce resource, nor does it 
have a linear effect on mortality. The niche has a carrying capacity, below which all 
organizations prosper. Also, in terms of institutional process (e.g., DiMaggio and Powell 
1983; Meyer and Rowan 1977), a growth in the density can increase the institutional 
legitimacy of a specific organizational form – institutional isomorphism. To sum up, 
rising density can encourage the addition of new organizations to the population. 
However, the limited carrying capacity of the niche produces a ceiling on the legitimation 
process. After the threshold of the capacity is reached, competition operates to eliminate 
relatively incompetent organizations, and the denser the population is, the more 
intensified the competition becomes. Because of the legitimation and the competition 
effects, organizational decline and death are expected to have a non-monotonic 
relationship with population density.  
 
Hypothesis 1: (non-monotonic relation) Organizational decline or death 
rates will have a U-shaped relation with the population density.    
 
 Organizations are imprinted with social structure or environmental variables that 
were common when they were formed (Stinchcombe 1965). In this context, the social 
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context at time when an organization was founded influences the decline and death of the 
organization. First, some functions, such as national defense and foreign affairs, are 
considered essential enough to be implemented at the organizational level in a 
government. So, organizations assigned to perform the core functions become founding 
members of a government, and their continued existence has been perceived as being 
taken for granted. Second, new organizations established in competition periods tend to 
be pushed to the margin of resource distribution and cannot move quickly from 
organizing to full-scale operation (Carroll and Hannan 1989), which results in less-
developed organizational routines and low capacity to overcome challenges. That is, new 
entrants are subject to severe selection pressures. Since an increase in population density 
implies an increase in the number of rivals and intense competition for limited resources, 
it is expected that population density at time of founding is positively related to 
organizational decline or death.  
 
Hypothesis 2: (founding membership) Founding organizations are less 
likely to experience decline or death.     
Hypothesis 3: (density at time of founding) A higher level of density at 
time of establishment will increase organizational decline or death.     
 
 The degrees of legitimation and competition effects vary by hierarchical 
characteristics of a group of organizations (Carroll and Wade 1991; Hannan et al. 1995). 
To put it more precisely, competition effects operate more strongly in localized 
environments, whereas legitimation effects are more pronounced in wider institutional 
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environments (Hannan et al. 1995). Competition for resources should become more 
intense between organizations in the same localized group – subpopulation – because it 
amounts to a constant-sum game, in comparison with competition between organizations 
in different groups which depend on different resource sources. On the contrary, an 
increase in the number of organizations in a subpopulation legitimizes the emergence of 
new organizations in other subpopulations. In light of this finding, it is predicted that 
competition is more acute between organizations in the same subpopulation than between 
those which have different functions.  
 
Hypothesis 4: (localized competition) An increase in the density of a 
subpopulation will increase organizational decline or death rates.     
 
 The niche theory argues that if environmental change is fluctuating and of long 
standing (i.e., a highly variable and coarse-grained environment), generalist organizations 
are more likely than specialist ones to survive because their organizational slack is finally 
utilized to overcome harsh environmental conditions and survive. And, the more slack 
resources an organization has, the more likely it is to survive. However, it is not easy to 
measure the amount of slack resources because they include various types of resources, 
such as personnel, knowledge, technology, financial assets and others. Thus, 
organizational size has been widely used as a proxy for organizational slack (Hannan and 
Freeman 1989). In other words, large organizations generally have more slack resources 
than small ones, and thus may be able to ensure reliability and accountability of their 
performance even in changing environments. Also, when survival is at stake and 
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organizations need additional resources from the outside, large organizations are more 
likely to be supported because of their prominence, high visibility, and significance in the 
society (Starbuck 1965). The liability of smallness plays an important role in 
organizational decline and death, and two hypotheses are suggested with respect to the 
influence of organizational slack.  
 
Hypothesis 5: (competitive advantage) In a highly variable and coarse-
grained environment, generalist organizations are more likely than 
specialist ones to survive.       
Hypothesis 6: (organizational size) Organizational decline or death rates 
decrease with the size of an organization.  
 
Structural Inertia: Demographic Characteristics      
 The strength of structural inertia varies with demographic characteristics of an 
organization, so organizational decline and death are also expected to be influenced by 
these factors. Since Stinchcombe (1965) introduced the liability of newness, new 
organizations are believed to suffer from a high rate of organizational mortality (Carroll 
and Delacroix 1982; Freeman et al. 1983; Hannan and Freeman 1984). A significant 
amount of time and effort is needed for newly established organizations to set up 
organizational roles and routines, to develop relationships with existing organizations, 
and to form a channel for the inflow of resources from the environment. This additional 
consumption of resources becomes a disadvantage for new organizations which are being 
exposed to competitive threats, and they are more likely to be defeated by existing ones. 
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Meanwhile, vulnerability of young organizations to competitive threat and environmental 
change is most apparent in the immediate newborn period, so it is expected that the 
average rate of organizational mortality decreases rapidly over the very early portion of 
the life span (Hannan and Freeman 1988).  
  
Figure 7. Organizational Mortality Rate by Age 
 
 
 In addition to the liability of newness, however, it should be simultaneously noted 
that organizational founding is the outcome of natural selection. That is, the environment 
serves as a niche for newly established organizations, creating suitable conditions for 
their growth as well as emergence. In addition, all organizations have been established 
with a certain amount of initial resources and endowments that help themselves to 
survive during their early stages of high failure rates. Consequently, new organizations 
are viewed as legitimate and have increasing access to resources as long as the favorable 
environment lasts (Singh et al. 1986). An initial stock of resources or the acquisition of 
legitimacy may attenuate the liability of newness in terms of age dependence, which 
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brings about a honeymoon period – low risk at very young age (Amburgey et al. 1993; 
Brüderl and Schüssler 1990; Fichman and Levinthal 1991; Singh et al. 1986). After this 
period, organizational mortality rate jumps to a high level as predicted by the liability of 
newness (i.e., t2 in Figure 7). This tendency is termed as liability of youngness because 
time passed after the founding. Accordingly, three hypotheses are proposed to explain the 
effect of age on organizational decline or death.  
 
Hypothesis 7: (honeymoon period) Organizations are less likely to be 
terminated, but more likely to grow up in their infancy.      
Hypothesis 8: (liability of youngness) Organizational mortality or decline 
is negatively related with the age of the organization after the honeymoon 
period.        
Hypothesis 9: (decreasing convexity) After the liability of youngness 
operates, organizational mortality rate reduces at a decreasing rate.         
 
 As Simon (1962) has argued, a hierarchical structure has an evolutionary 
advantage because it simplifies links among subunits or functions. That is, a hierarchical 
structure can reduce internal conflicts and make coordination more efficient, which may 
strengthen the ability of an organization to overcome environmental changes – strong 
structural inertia. And also, hierarchical systems are characterized by localized flow of 
information, commands, and resources for each subunit or function. Localized structure 
prevents one or a few subunits, which are highly sensitive to environmental change, from 
transmitting vulnerability to others and putting the whole organization at risk (Hannan 
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and Freeman 1984). On the other hand, in less hierarchical and complex organizations, 
structure is less stable, and change in one subunit requires adjustments by many more 
subunits. Consequently, complex organizations have a low inertia and are more 
vulnerable to external shocks than hierarchical and simple organizations. 
 
Hypothesis 10: (organizational complexity) Complex organizations have 
higher rates of organizational decline or death.           
 
 If organizations have previously experienced decline, their structures are less 
inertial than those of organizations without such experience (Baum and Amburgey 2002; 
Downs 1966). More specifically, as organizational learning theory predicts, since 
organizations experiencing decline in structure could escape negative natural selection at 
any rate, they may also consider reorganization as a solution when facing other 
environmental threats (Amburgey et al. 1993). However, organizational decline is not 
always a successful strategy for survival. As mentioned already, rational adaptation to 
environmental changes is not possible in reality, and frequent attempts to reorganize 
produce low levels of reliability and accountability (Hannan and Freeman 1984). So, 
organizations, which experienced structural decline in the past, have high rates of 
organizational mortality. Meanwhile, it is also speculated that the more recently an 
organization experienced structural decline, the more likely that reorganization is 
considered as a plausible response to environmental changes and finally the lower the 
rate of survival of the organization is (Amburgey et al. 1993). Thus, two hypotheses are 
offered regarding the effect of experience on organizational mortality.  
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Hypothesis 11: (history dependence) If organizations experienced 
structural decline in the past, their mortality rates will increase.    
Hypothesis 12: (elapsed-time effect) The organizational mortality rate 
decreases with the elapsed time since the occurrence of structural decline.  
 
Distinctive Environment for Public Organizations      
 Although organizational ecology pays attention to the effect of the environment 
on organizational change, it has developed mainly in the business sector and does not 
identify distinct characteristics of public organizations. When it comes to multiple 
dimensions of the environment, public organizations is characterized by political control, 
and political variation is one of key drivers of natural selection in the public sector. 
Unlike the business sector, where organizational decline and termination are determined 
on the basis of performance, whether or not an organization is perceived as successful 
depends on political predispositions (Lewis 2002).  
 Political turnover is a profound change in political environment because it 
exposes vulnerable organizations to the threat of termination or downsizing by providing 
the opponents with an opportunity to punish them (Berry et al. 2010; Boin et al. 2010; 
James et al. 2015; Kaufman 1976; Lewis 2002). Political control occurs in two realms: 
the executive branch and the legislature (Wood and Waterman 1991). A chief executive 
officer (a president in a presidential system or a prime minister in a parliamentary system) 
has multiple mechanisms of executive control and can reorganize or even abolish an 
agency which is perceived as underperforming. Also, the legislature participates in the 
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process of reorganizing organizational structure and can directly (in a parliamentary 
system) or indirectly (in a presidential system) control public agencies (James et al. 2015; 
Lewis 2002). Thus, it is expected that if a party which opposes a certain public agency 
comes into power in the executive branch or the legislature, then the organization are 
more likely to be terminated or decline.      
 
Hypothesis 13: (change in the executive branch) An organization 
established by a party other than the one in the executive branch in any 
given year will be more likely to be terminated or decline.      
Hypothesis 14: (change in the legislature) An organization established by 
a party other than the one in the legislature in any given year will be more 
likely to be terminated or decline.    
 
 Since executive and legislative control occur independently in a presidential 
system, their preference on a certain organization may be opposite to each other. For 
example, the initiative of a new president to abolish the agency might fail due to the 
opposition of the legislature or vice versa. However, if a party controls both the executive 
branch and the legislature – unified government, then it will be easier to terminate or 
downsize organizations which have been supported by the party's opponents (Lewis 
2002).   
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Hypothesis 15: (unified government) If an unfriendly party controls both 
the executive branch and the legislature, organizations established by 
other parties are more likely to be terminated or decline.  
 
  A response to changes in economic environment (especially, market failure) is 
clearly different between private and public organizations. How business firms are 
affected by economic changes is relatively predictable because their relationship with the 
economic environment is very simple: selling goods and services in a market for a profit. 
Economic crises or recessions generally reduce consumption demand and the amount of 
resources flowing into business firms, leading to an increase in organizational decline or 
even mortality. On the other hand, a response of the public sector to economic crises is 
very complex. Like business firms, some organizations are under pressure to cut budgets 
and end some programs perceived as ineffective or costly during an economic crisis. 
However, not surprisingly, a government is under pressure to take on the role to 
overcome market failure by preventing another crisis from taking shape and by 
stimulating its depressed economy. So, in the public sector, certain existing organizations 
are allocated more resources or new organizations are established to combat economic 
crises, as was the case with New Deal agencies. In this connection, I speculate that an 
economic crisis has a negative impact on the decline or the mortality of public 
organizations.    
 
Hypothesis 16: (economic crisis) An economic crisis has a negative 
influence on organizational decline and mortality in the public sector.   
 
  108 
 
 
 In addition to the negative effect of an economic crisis, economic growth is also 
expected to have a negative association with organizational decline and death in the 
public sector. Wagner (1890, 1893) put forward his hypothesis of increasing expansion of 
government activities along with economic growth, nowadays known as "Wagner's Law." 
He suggests three reasons for the increased government activities. First, in 
industrialization and modernization, the demand for public protection and regulation 
grows, leading to an increase in government activities. Second, income growth has led to 
the requirement for a government to provide further income-elastic services, such as 
welfare, education, and culture. Finally, economic and technological development 
requires a government to manage natural monopolies (e.g., railroads), which the private 
sector would be unable to finance and run efficiently. In line with the theory, I speculate 
that economic development promotes an environment in which organizations providing 
social protection or income-elastic services can thrive. As the other side of the same coin, 
if an economy is less developed, the demand would be relatively modest. Instead, it is 
expected that organizations in charge of economic affairs are more likely to thrive 
because the society is more concerned to advance their economy.  
 
Hypothesis 17: (economic development & social protection) As an 
economy becomes advanced, organizations in charge of social protection 
are less likely to decline or be terminated.  
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Hypothesis 18: (economic development & income-elastic services) As an 
economy becomes advanced, organizations providing income-elastic 
services are less likely to decline or be terminated.    
Hypothesis 19: (economic development & economic affairs) As an 
economy becomes advanced, organizations in charge of economic affairs 
are more likely to decline or be terminated.    
 
Suggestions for Empirical Work     
 Theoretical progress can only be made through precise and ultimately falsifiable 
predictions (O'Toole and Meier 1999). In addition, the translation of a theory from one 
area to another often makes a trade-off of accuracy against generality. Thus, empirical 
research is needed to determine the validity of organizational ecology in the public sector 
as well as to provide knowledge and understanding of what actually happens. This study 
suggests empirical directions and methods for future investigation.  
 
Data Collection  
 Given that organizational ecology is basically to analyze the life histories of 
organizations, panel data with a long time dimension are required. To put it more 
technically, because organizational change (e.g., birth, growth, decline, and death) is a 
qualitative alteration of an organization's life cycle, a continuous measurement of the 
qualitative dependent variables over the lifetime of an organization – event history data – 
would be a fruitful avenue for future investigation.  
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Figure 8. Types of Censorship in Event History Data  
 
 
 Observations of event histories are often censored. That is, researchers have no 
information on organizational change prior to (left censorship) or after (right censorship) 
a certain date (see Figure 8). While right censorship problem can be handled by analysis 
methods, both full and partial left censorship problems (A and B in Figure 8) result in 
substantial error and make it impossible to employ sophisticated event history analysis 
such as duration analysis. Instead, data with left censorship can be analyzed by pooled 
logit models. However, it should be noted that the length of time leading up to an event is 
not of interest in the models and, more seriously, that logit regression assumes statistical 
equilibrium, that is, stability of the process. As discussed in the theory section, 
organizational change in the public sector is subject to time-varying characteristics of the 
environment, so time-stationary condition cannot be satisfied. In order to examine 
empirically organizational decline and death, researchers should have data with few 
censorship problems, especially if possible, without left censorship problems.  
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 The fact that the unit of analysis in organizational ecology studies is a population 
suggests a few considerations regarding data sampling. First, researchers have to choose 
which population is to be studied. This approach may be criticized as selection bias, but 
at the same time, it allows an up-close, in-depth, and detailed examination as a case study. 
Second, ecology studies ideally have to examine all organizations in a population in order 
to avoid selection bias of organizations which have good recording-keeping and still 
thrive. By doing so, they can generate transferable findings among organizations, which 
is the ultimate goal of organization studies.  
 
Operationalization of Variables    
 Although an organizational population (e.g., industry in the business sector) is the 
unit of analysis, its members are not totally homogeneous. Heterogeneity within a 
population is more obvious in a government, and ignoring the issue can yield a severely 
distorted picture of reality. Especially, because public organizations perform different 
tasks, change in population density may have different consequences depending on 
function of an entry or exit organizations. For example, a newly-entered organization can 
increase competition among organizations whose functions overlap with the new one, but 
have less effect on the life cycle of others with different functions. Thus, in the 
application of organizational ecology to the public sector, subjects in a population should 
be sub-grouped in terms of their functions (i.e., subpopulation). There would be various 
approaches to disaggregate a population, a universal way is required for comparison and 
generalization of findings across studies. In this connection, the Classification of the 
Functions of Government (COFOG) of the United Nations (UN) would be very helpful 
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because it can be used for studies from anywhere in the world. The COFOG classifies 
government functions into 10 subpopulations: 1) general public services; 2) defense; 3) 
public order & safety; 4) economic affairs; 5) environmental protection; 6) housing & 
community amenities; 7) health; 8) recreation, culture & religion; 9) education; and 10) 
social protection.   
 Key explanatory variables in ecology studies are the density of a population and 
demographic characteristics of an organization. Population density has been usually 
measured by counting the number of organizations in a population (e.g., Carroll and 
Swaminathan 1992; Hannan and Freeman 1988). And also, as the concept of 
subpopulation implies, ecology studies in the public sector should consider the density of 
a subpopulation. Since subpopulations are identified within a population, subpopulation 
density can be captured by how much the subpopulation accounts for in terms of either 
the number of members or the amount of expenditures. For example, a subpopulation of 5 
organizations is dense if the total population is composed of only 10 organizations (i.e., 
accounting for 50%), but sparse if there are 100 members in the total population (i.e., 
5%).  
 Organizational size and strategy (generalist vs. specialist) should be also 
examined with regard to the niche theory. Size is operationalized by two indicators: 1) 
the number of full-time employees; and 2) the amount of the total budget. Although the 
former is a direct measure of size, it may create bias due to heterogeneity among 
subpopulations. For example, it overestimates organizations with labor-intensive services, 
such as defense and education, but underestimates those with capital-intensive services, 
such as economic affairs and health. Therefore, the best approach for measuring 
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organizational size is to examine both of the two indicators. The effect of strategy has 
been generally analyzed as a dummy variable in most previous studies based on the size 
of sales area, the number of products, or the amount of total sales (e.g., see Brüderl et al. 
1992; Carroll 1985; Carroll and Swaminathan. 1992; Freeman and Hannan 1983), but the 
dichotomous measurement does not capture the extent of generalism or specialism. On 
the other hand, if researchers identify organizations through the specialism-generalism 
spectrum, measurement error could arise because there are no organizations which 
disclose all information on their organizational strategy and because subjective 
classification by researchers would take up the slack with incorrect categorizations. Thus, 
an optimal approach is to count the number of functions of an organization. To put it 
more directly, if an organization performs only one of the 10 functions defined by the 
COFOG, the count variable of organizational strategy takes value of 1, meaning that the 
organization is a specialist. However, if an organization has multiple functions, the count 
variable is coded as 2 or greater, considering the observation as a generalist. And also, 
this simple counting can measure the extent of generalism: Bigger values except 1 
indicate more generalism. For example, in Figure 9, organizations in the shaded area (i.e., 
A, B, C, and D) perform at least two functions, whereas others commit to a specific 
function. Thus, the formers are considered as generalists. And among them, organization 
A is more general because its niche covers three functions.  
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Figure 9. Measuring Organizational Strategy by Functions   
 
 
 Age and organizational complexity are key antecedent variables for the inertia-
survival relationship. Like a person's age, organizational age is measured by the number 
of years of continuous existence since founding. Sometimes, an organization is abolished 
and re-established with the same (or very similar) structures as before. In this case, 
organizational ecology argues that environmental changes again provide niche 
opportunities to and revive the organization, so the re-establishment is considered as 
organizational founding, and the age is reset to zero.  
 Organizational complexity is defined in different ways by different disciplines, 
leading to various operationalizations, for instance, the number of subunits or functions, 
and even size (Dooley 2002). Fortunately, organizational ecology defines complexity as 
patterns of links among subunits, measuring by the number of links (Hannan and 
Freeman 1989). However, since links with others are cognitive content, it is almost 
impossible to measure links among subunits for the entire history of organizational 
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change. So, I suggest a proxy variable of complexity score as an alternative way of 
estimating the number of links, which is based on three central ideas. First, a subunit 
should explicitly or implicitly cooperate with others to maintain and perform their work 
and role. Second, as cited already in the hypothesis section, a hierarchical structure 
simplifies links among subunits (Simon 1962). Third, a tall hierarchical structure leads to 
an increase in bureaucratic procedures (e.g., red tape) for a link of cooperation. The value 
of the proxy is calculated as follows:  
�
𝑛𝑖 × (𝑛𝑖 − 1)
2
𝑘
𝑖=1
× 𝑘 × 𝑙 , 
where ni is the number of sections in division i, k is the number of divisions under a 
deputy secretary, and l is the number of deputy secretaries.  
 
Figure 10. Complexity Score and Hierarchical Structure    
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 A traditional proxy – the number of the lowest subunits – considers the three 
organizations in Figure 10 as having the same level of organizational complexity because 
they have the same number of sections. Or if a researcher operationalizes complexity as 
the number of total subunits below the secretary level, organization C is the most 
complex. However, these traditional proxy approaches overlook a hierarchical structure 
and generate biased estimates. The complexity score not only measures the number of 
links among sections (i.e., 𝑛𝑖×(𝑛𝑖−1)
2
), but also reflects effects of hierarchy (i.e., 
multiplying it by k and l) – simplifying versus complicating patterns of links. To put it 
more concretely, although organization A and B have the same number of sections, the 
latter is more hierarchical, so its complexity score is lower than the former's (see Figure 
10). On the other hand, a tall hierarchy increases bureaucratic procedures and 
organizational complexity. The complexity score captures the negative effect of a tall 
hierarchy. For instance, the complexity score of organization C is higher than that of 
organization B even though the former has a more hierarchical structure.     
  Political turnover is directly measured on dichotomous scale (e.g., Lewis 2002, 
2004). Change in the executive branch and in the legislature would be captured by a 
dummy variable which takes a value of 1 if an opposition party controls the executive 
branch or a majority of seats in the legislature, and 0 otherwise. An indicator for unified 
government equals 1 if the executive branch and the legislature are occupied by the same 
political party, and 0 otherwise. Meanwhile, in order to accurately assess the actual effect 
of legislative change, the strength of a majority party should be also examined, which can 
be gauged by the percentage of its seats.  
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 Various economic data are available for testing the influence of changes in 
economic environment. The effect of an economic crisis has been generally examined by 
a binary indicator. However, although the dummy captures a sudden and unpredicted 
economic shock, it overlooks that economic depression occurs even in non-crisis years 
and that the extent of the seriousness of an economic crisis varies. To complement the 
indicator, other business cycle variables, such as unemployment and the gross domestic 
product (GDP) growth rate, should be included in analysis. The level of economic 
development can be measured by real GDP per capita which is adjusted for price change 
(i.e., inflation).  
 
Empirical Methods: Duration Analysis  
 Response variables in ecology studies have the form of a duration, and recent 
treatments of duration analysis tend to focus on the hazard function (Wooldridge 2010). It 
is defined as  
𝑟(𝑡) = lim𝑡′→𝑡
Pr�𝑡≤𝑇<𝑡′�𝑇≥𝑡�
𝑡′−𝑡
. 
T is the length of time that a subject changes. r(t) is a transition rate or hazard rate, 
providing the possibility of giving a local, time-related description of how the process 
(e.g., organizational change in this study) evolves over time.  
 Of different event history methods with the hazard function, parametric models of 
time-dependence and semi-parametric transition rate models are best suited to 
organizational ecology research. First, parametric models generally focus on how the rate 
of transition (e.g., organizational decline or death) changes with analysis time (e.g., age). 
Other covariates are tested as to whether they affect the direction (increasing or 
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decreasing) and the slope of a transition rate curve (see, for example, Figure 11a). 
Meanwhile, it should be noted that using a parametric model whose distribution does not 
fit a given dataset can lead to misleading results (Blossfeld et al. 2007). Therefore, 
because it is hypothesized that the relationship of organizational death to age is bell-
shaped (see Figure 6), the log-normal or the log-logistic model would be more 
appropriate than other monotonic models, such as the Weibull and the Gompertz model 
(Figure 11b). 
 
Figure 11. Transition Rate Curves 
 
 
 Second, time in parametric models serves as a proxy for latent factors, and the 
influence of other covariates on the transition rate are not directly specified. Semi-
parametric modes are suggested as alternatives, and the proportional hazard model 
proposed by Cox (1972) is the most widely used semi-parametric model. In the Cox 
model, the transition, r(t), is the product of an unspecified baseline rate, h(t), and a vector 
of time-dependent covariates, A(t),: 
𝑟(𝑡) = ℎ(𝑡)exp (𝐴(𝑡)𝛼). 
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α is a vector of associated coefficients. However, the Cox regression has two limitations: 
First, covariates have to be strictly exogenous (Wooldridge 2010); and second, the model 
is only used if the shape of a transition rate curve is not affected by covariates (Blossfeld 
et al. 2007). To sum up, researchers are required to design their own models depending 
on their datasets and which variables are of interest.   
 
Conclusion  
 Organizational change is a result of a relationship between an organization and 
the environment. However, most previous studies have focused on an organization's 
activities, overlooking the environment as a significant determinant. The rational system 
perspective (e.g., Taylor's scientific management or Weber's bureaucracy theory), which 
is based on rationality, infers that organizations can achieve immortality by setting up 
specific goals and formalizing their structures. Although departing from the rationality 
assumption, scholars with the natural system perspective (e.g., Mayo's human relations or 
Barnard's cooperative system) have still concentrated on internal organizational 
arrangements. They believe that organizing occurs against the environment and often 
omit the effect of the environment on the life cycle of organizations. However, as the 
environment becomes more complex, less predictable, and intractable, it is necessary to 
investigate how environmental change influences organizations. 
Thus, in this study, I try to understand the effect of the environment on organizational 
decline and death by defining an organization as an open system not being sealed off 
from their environment.  
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 Organizational ecology is an ideal tool for studying environmental effects on 
organizations. Given the import of theoretical elements from bio-ecology, it is not 
surprising that organizational ecology takes an extreme position in the organization-
environment spectrum, arguing that adaptation strategies of organizations to the 
environment are incomplete and useless. Rather, the narrow but intense focus on the 
environment helps us understand organizations by broadening and deepening our view to 
encompass environmental influences on organizations. Basically, organizational ecology 
identifies which organizations are able to overcome environmental changes and thrive. 
First, the inertia theory argues that demographic characteristics, such as organizational 
age, structural complexity, and history, are important factors in predicting survival of 
organizations. Second, according to the niche theory, an organizational population is the 
most important and influential part of the environment. An increase in the density is a 
critical environmental change and affects organizational survival in two opposing ways: 
institutional isomorphism vs. competition for limited resources. Also, the theory asserts 
that two organizational strategies (generalist and specialist) have their own competitive 
advantage in terms of environmental variation: specialists in stable environments vs. 
generalists in long-term fluctuating environments.   
 However, organizational ecology has been extensively studied in the business 
sector. Even though public and private organizations share the majority of organizational 
principles, such as organizing mechanisms, assuming the sameness of the two types is far 
from the reality. Above all, ecological studies on business firms have generally 
emphasized competition with rivals in the market. They have rarely paid attention on 
other environmental factors except market control. Thus, in the application of 
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organizational ecology to public organizations, I incorporate their distinctive interactions 
with the political and economic environment. First, as previous literature has examined, 
external political control is instrumental in bringing about the termination of public 
organizations. So, I suggest several variables of political change and hypothesize how 
they affect the decline and death of public organizations. Second, the effect of the 
economic environment on the life cycle of public organizations is not as straightforward 
and simple as their effect on business firms. As Wagner's Law implies, economic growth 
is closely associated with an increase in government activities, particularly regarding 
social protection and income-elastic services (e.g., welfare and culture). An economic 
crisis also often provides public organizations with the chance to grow, such as the 
expansion of structures or expenditures, because it is required that the public sector takes, 
to a lesser or greater degree, the role to cope with the market failure.  
 Despite the recognition of the importance of the environment to the life cycle of 
organizations, there are few attempts to examine how and how much public organizations 
are subject to environmental changes. Given that an organization can be fully understood 
when viewed through three theoretical lenses – rational, natural, and open system 
perspectives, the absence of the realization of the interaction of organizations with the 
environment may lead to misunderstanding or incomplete knowledge. This matter clearly 
deserves more theoretical and empirical attention. In addition, although a number of 
studies have examined the effect of political factors on the termination of public 
organizations, most of them fail to systemize their results and to discuss general 
theoretical implications (Adam et al. 2007). To avoid this critique, a strong theory is 
required, which provides a broad conceptual framework. In this connection, I hope this 
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study may help lay the groundwork for future research on the effect of the environment 
on organizational change by refining organization ecology so as to be transferable to the 
public sector and by suggesting empirical strategies to test the theory.  
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Chapter V 
Conclusion  
 
Summary  
 Although organizations as social institutions are considered as key actors in a 
modern society in the field of not only sociology and business management, but also 
political science and public administration, a better understanding of organizations rests 
on the recognition that they perform at different settings. Thus, as I lay out in Chapter I, 
the motivation of this dissertation is to contribute to a better understanding of public 
organizations by recognizing the difference between the public and the private sector. 
Especially, I focus on addressing three critical issues that most public organizations face 
or will face as they grow: innovation adoption, representation in personnel, and 
environmental effect on organizational survival. 
 In Chapter II, I examine the initial state of innovation diffusion, that is, which 
public organizations become early adopters. At the initial stage, there are no role models 
or competitors who trigger the diffusion mechanisms of learning, competition, and 
imitation. And also, early adopters produce neighbor or regional effects to subsequent 
adopters. Thus, early adoption of innovation should be scrutinized as an independent 
topic worthy of attention. The main finding of the second chapter is that performance-
based motivation has a twofold impact on early innovation adoption: negative for 
organizations with low performance, but positive for those with very high performance. 
This study estimates top 3.8% as the turning point defining which organizations attain 
outstanding performance and show the positive relationship between performance and 
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innovation adoption. In short, not every organization can become a pioneer in the 
diffusion of an innovation. Only those who need it or can do it mark the kickoff of 
innovation diffusion. In addition to the motivation, some organizational characteristics – 
organizational size, pro-innovation bias of an outside superior, and successful experience 
of implementing a similar innovation in the past – are also found as significant 
determinants of early innovation adoption. Finally, this study finds that innovations can 
be adopted for a symbolic or a substantive purpose: symbolic for complying with the 
external demands versus substantive for improving the status quo. Through this study, I 
contribute to the innovation adoption literature by unpacking the process of early 
innovation adoption and to the public management literature by examining the effect of 
performance on the motivation to innovate and innovation adoption.  
 In Chapter III, I develop a theoretical framework for predicting and explaining 
active representation in bureaucracy and test two hypotheses from the framework to test 
its validity.  Most of previous literature has focused on the transformation of passive into 
active representation, that is, conditions of active representation – policy discretion and a 
critical mass. On the other hand, in this study, I focus on behavior of why and how 
bureaucrats decide to serve as active representatives. An informal group in an 
organization has relations with other informal groups and the organization. So, the 
intention of an informal group to benefit their social group may conflict with that of other 
informal groups or formal roles socialized by the organization to accomplish 
organizational goals. The framework that I develop in this chapter is based on the basic 
assumption of public choice theory that humans are utility maximizers. In other words, 
bureaucrats are expected to choose the optimal point between formal rewards from an 
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organization and informal rewards from an informal group. As a result, they are not 
totally devoted to advance interest of their informal and social group (i.e., group interest). 
But instead, they optimize their self-interests in the trade-off with group interest. From 
this framework, I derive and test two hypotheses. First, active representation requires the 
loss of organizational rewards. Second, a minority group mobilizes external support to 
minimize the cost of active representation. These findings support that active 
representation is a political activity in which bargaining between formal and informal 
roles occurs. In addition, I add evidence to the literature demonstrating that the two 
prerequisites – policy discretion and a critical mass – must be satisfied for active 
representation to occur. Especially, the size of a critical mass depends on the context. A 
larger size of a critical mass is necessary if a minority group has no partner groups and 
cannot expand the base of internal support for their active representation and/or if the 
culture of a society is less concerned about diversity and minority rights. For example, I 
show that because of the two reasons, women in the Korean bureaucracy need a critical 
mass of about 40% for their active representation. This essay is probably the only one in 
examining conditions of the intention to serve as active representatives as well as 
conditions of the action.  
 To predict which organizations in a government will survive, we should first 
answer the question of which organizations will be selected by the environment for 
survival. In Chapter IV, I argue that organizational change is a result of a relationship 
between an organization and the environment. And, I suggest and advance the theory of 
organizational ecology for examining environment effect on organizational decline and 
death. The theory has been extensively studies in the business sector, so I advance the 
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theory to be applicable to the public sector. First, I add political variables, such as change 
in the executive branch and the legislature, unified government, and hypothesize that (1) 
an organization established by a party other than the one in the executive branch in any 
given year will be more likely to be terminated or decline; that (2) an organization 
established by a party other than the one in the legislature in any given year will be more 
likely to be terminated or decline; and that (3) if an unfriendly party controls both the 
executive branch and the legislature, organizations established by other parties are more 
likely to be terminated or decline. Second, the effect of the economic environment on the 
life cycle of public organizations is not as straightforward and simple as their effect on 
business firms. As Wagner's Law implies, economic growth is closely associated with an 
increase in government activities, particularly regarding social protection and income-
elastic services (e.g., welfare and culture). An economic crisis also often provides public 
organizations with the chance to grow, such as the expansion of structures or 
expenditures, because it is required that the public sector takes, to a lesser or greater 
degree, the role to cope with the market failure. Additionally, I suggest empirical 
directions and methods to test hypotheses that I set for in this essay for future studies. 
First, because ecology studies investigate the history of an organization, event history 
data are required. And, when collecting data, researchers should be cautious about 
censorship problems, particularly left censorship. Second, I propose ways to 
operationalize key explanatory variables, for example, measuring organizational 
complexity and subpopulations. Finally, I introduce duration analysis as a proper research 
method for analyzing event history.  
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Future Research  
 This dissertation has contributed to a better understanding of public organizations 
by extending the literature on innovation diffusion, representative bureaucracy, and 
organizational survival. At the same time, however, the three essays are not meant to be 
definitive studies, but rather serve as starting points for future research.  
 The first essay on innovation management focuses on the early adoption of 
innovations among public organizations. Thus, in order to draw a full picture of diffusion 
process of an innovation, it is necessary to examine which organizations are more likely 
to become followers after the initiation of the innovation. Fortunately, the Appalachian 
Math and Science Partnership (AMSP) has been implemented since 2002, and I have 
panel data on how the policy has been diffused in the organizational population. In the 
succeeding study, I will also examine effects of performance and other organizational 
characteristics on the decision of potential acceptors to participate in the diffusion. 
However, the main research question is whether diffusion mechanisms – learning, 
competition, and imitation – operate and how they affect adoption by followers. And also, 
I hypothesize that the three mechanisms are sequentially activated. While learning is the 
process to determine whether an innovation implemented by others has been successful, 
competition does not require evidence of success. The fact that rivals already adopted the 
innovation is the reason of adoption by followers. So, it is expected that competition is 
preceding learning. On the other hand, later adoption is not predicted by organizational 
characteristics, but is related to the pressure of homogeneity. As a result, an innovation 
can become recognized as taken-for-granted after it has been adopted by a large number 
of organizations. Therefore, imitation would be the last diffusion mechanism. This study 
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will provide a full picture of innovation diffusion in conjunction with Chapter II in this 
dissertation.  
 
Figure 12. Order of Diffusion Mechanisms 
 
 
 In Chapter III, I use organizational-level data to test the framework of active 
representation. Although a fallacy of division is common and does not cause a statistical 
issue, the framework describes active representation as an individual decision. And also, 
individuals have different levels of reward motivation and socialization pressure for 
active representation and that the intensity of active representation depends on individual 
characteristics. Thus, an empirical analysis using individual-level data is required. I have 
been looking for survey data in which respondents (i.e., bureaucrats) were asked about 
how they perceive informal roles for their social group and formal roles assigned by their 
organizations. At the same time, I design a survey experiment in case of no available data. 
Although finding data or conducting a survey experiment takes a lot of time, 
investigating whether individuals maximize their self-interest in the trade-off between 
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formal and informal rewards is required to test the validity of the framework of active 
representation suggested in Chapter III.  
 Third, in order to test the hypotheses regarding organizational decline and death 
in Chapter IV, I am collecting data on the history of the Korean central government. This 
dataset includes all information on the histories of public organizations in Korea since 
1948 when Korea was officially established since being liberated from Japanese colonial 
rule between 1910 and 1945. So, the dataset has a critical advantage as a sample – 
minimizing censorship problems. Above all, there is no left censorship in the dataset. 
And also, Korea has experienced rapid technological and societal change. For example, 
the country was established as one of the poorest countries in 1948, but it has now grown 
as a country showing off a rapid economic development and advanced industries such as 
electronic and shipbuilding industries. Thus, it is ideal for investigating the history of 
Korean government agencies so as to find general and more comprehensive patterns on 
organizational decline and death in the public sector. The dataset will allow me not only 
to suggest the theory of organizational ecology as a theoretical framework for analyzing 
environmental effects on organizational survival, but also provide empirical evidence on 
whether my suggestions are sensible and more details about how the environment selects 
which organizations survive.  
 Finally, as an effort to connect the three issues (innovation adoption, workforce 
diversity, and the life-cycle of an organization), I hypothesize several relationships 
among them. 1) More diversified organizations are more likely to adopt an innovation 
because they are rationally designed to minimize incentives and communication problems 
which may hinder innovation adoption. 2) Although diversification has advantages in 
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terms of innovation adoption, more diversified organizations are more difficult to manage. 
Thus, it can be also speculated that diversified organizations do not readily adopt an 
innovation than others. And 3) high performance in some dimensions which are not 
directly related to an innovation may also influence the probability of adopting the 
innovation because performance has multiple dimensions. Organizations may try to offset 
low performance in some dimension by high performance in other dimensions. Or high 
performance in some dimensions may encourage risk-taking in adopting an innovation, 
even though the innovation is to improve performance in other dimensions.  
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Appendix A 
A Superior's Pro-innovation Bias: Intention to Endorse the AMSP  
 To generate the residual-based measures of a superior's pro-AMSP bias, I first 
design the prediction model. The dependent variable is a dummy variable indicating 
whether or not a superintendent in Appalachian Kentucky entered into partnership with 
the AMSP in 2002. Seven independent variables are used to predict the probability of 
endorsing it: three personal characteristics; two district characteristics; and two 
environmental characteristics.  
 
Table A.1. Logit Model for Predicting Probability of Endorsing the AMSP 
 
 Table A.1. shows the results of the logit model. Although only one explanatory 
variable (total enrollment) is significant, it should be noted that the model is to identify 
superintendents with greater desire to participate in the project beyond some objective 
Dependent Variable = Dummy of Whether a Superintendent Endorsed the AMSP in 2002 
 Coefficient Standard Error z-statistic 
Personal Characteristics     
Job Experience  −0.0062 0.0400 −0.15 
Logged Salary  2.4058 3.1425 0.77 
Female Superintendent  −0.5245 0.9963 −0.53 
District's Characteristics     
Overall Performanceª   0.2970 0.2758 1.08 
Total Enrollment  0.0004 0.0002 1.97 
Environmental Characteristics      
Average Income of a District −0.0002 0.0001 −1.58 
Independent District  −1.4108 0.9104 −1.55 
Constant −24.2104 32.9724 −0.73 
N 74   
LR chi-squared 18.52   
P>𝑥2 0.0098   
Count R2 0.716   
ªThe variable is obtained by averaging math and science scores of all schools in a district and by summing 
the two values.   
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factors, not to provide a framework for district participation. That is, the main concern is 
the fitness of the model. The likelihood-ratio test indicates that the model is statistically 
significant at the 1% level. The model's goodness-of-fit is verified with the Count R-
squared index (0.716). The index is obtained by transforming the predicted probabilities 
into a binary variable (1 if the predicted probability is greater than 50% or 0 otherwise) 
and assessing the predictions as correct or not, so it implies that the model correctly 
predicts about 72 percent of superintendents' choices.  
 Since only schools in the 33 partner districts are analyzed in this study, I need the 
intentions of their superintendents to enter into a partnership with the AMSP in 2002. The 
intention is estimated by the residual-based approach. That is, the residual probability, 
which is not explained by objective variables in the prediction model, is used a proxy for 
a superintendent's pro-AMSP bias. Their actual probability to endorse the AMSP is 100%, 
so their intentions are determined by the following equation:    
 
Residual probability = 100% – Predicted probability from the prediction model 
 
 The remaining concern about this measure of the pro-AMSP bias is whether it is 
too strongly correlated with a school's participation in the AMSP. The correlation 
coefficient between the two variables is 0.252, meaning that superintendents' choice was 
not forced on their schools. In short, the intention of a superintendent to endorse the 
AMSP is one of factors influencing a school's choice.     
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Appendix B 
Wald Test for the Comprehensive Performance Variables in Model 2   
 I conduct a Wald test to examine the joint significance of the comprehensive 
performance variable and its squared measure. The chi-squared value generated by the 
test is 5.73, and the p-value is 0.057. From these results, it can be concluded that the 
coefficients of the two variables are not simultaneously equal to zero, meaning that the 
inclusion of the two variables improves the model fit.  
 
Confidence Interval of the Turning Point (Delta Method) 
 The estimated equation of Model 2 is as follows:  
 
𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑖𝑡{Pr(𝑦 = 1|𝑋} = ln �
Pr(𝑦 = 1|𝑋)
Pr(𝑦 = 0|𝑋)�
= 3.96 − 0.6752 ∗ 𝐶 + 0.0499 ∗ 𝐶2 + 𝑍𝛿 
       𝐶: comprehensive performance 
       𝑍: a vector of other variables 
        𝛿: a vector of coefficients 
 
 The turning point is obtained by taking the first derivative with respect to C and 
setting it equal to zero.  
𝜕𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑖𝑡{Pr(𝑦 = 1|𝑋}
𝜕𝐶
= −0.6752 + 0.0988 ∗ 𝐶 = 0 
 
 Since the turning point is the negative ratio of the two coefficients, its confidence 
interval can be calculated through the Delta method. I use the "nlcom" command in 
STATA software (version 12.0, StataCorp., TX, USA) to estimate a nonlinear 
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combination of the parameters. The 95% confidence interval of the turning point is about 
from 4.44 through 9.09.     
 
Marginal Effect of Comprehensive Performance  
 Because Model 2 includes not only the comprehensive performance variable but 
also its squared measure, the equation for obtaining the marginal effect is slightly 
different from the general equation. The marginal effect of comprehensive performance 
on the probability of adopting the AMSP is calculated through the below equation: 
 
𝜕 Pr(𝑦 = 1|𝑋)
∂𝐶
=
𝜕Λ(𝑋𝛽)
∂𝐶
=
𝜕 � exp(𝑋𝛽)1 + exp(𝑋𝛽)�
∂𝐶
= (𝛽𝐶 + 2𝛽𝐶2 ∗ 𝐶) ∗
exp (𝑋𝛽)
1 + exp(𝑋𝛽)
∗
1
1 + exp(𝑋𝛽)
 
      Λ: Logit function    
      𝐶: comprehensive performance 
      𝑋: a vector of all independent variables 
       𝛽: a vector of coefficients 
       𝛽𝐶: coefficient of 𝐶 
       𝛽𝐶2: coefficient of 𝐶2 
 
 This equation provides marginal effects of different levels of comprehensive 
performance. Other factors except performance variables are held constant at their means.  
 It is also possible to find the turning point from the above equation because the 
probability function, Pr(𝑦 = 1|𝑋) = exp(𝑋𝛽)
1+exp(𝑋𝛽)
, is another form of the estimated equation 
of Model 2. That is, by setting the derivative above equal to zero, the turning point can be 
found, where the slope of the probability graph is zero.   
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Appendix C 
Testing Hypothesis 2 by using a Confidence Interval     
 The estimated turning point of 6.77 is the turning point for the AMSP in 
Kentucky, not for other types of policies or organizations. No one can conclusively say 
that the point estimate is the population parameter. Instead, this study uses its 95% 
confidence interval so as to estimate the population parameter with the probability of 
random sampling error.    
  
Figure A.1. 95% Confidence Interval of the Estimated Turning Point 
 
 
 First, I develop the null (zero marginal effect) and the alternative (positive 
marginal effect) hypothesis. Figure A.1 shows that if the value of comprehensive 
performance is higher than 9.09, its marginal effect is positive. Nevertheless, this study 
conducts a two-tailed test for the null hypothesis.     
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𝐻0: (𝛽𝐶 + 2𝛽𝐶2 ∗ 𝐶) ∗
exp (𝑋𝛽)
{1 + exp(𝑋𝛽)}2
= 0, 𝑖𝑓 𝐶 > 9.09 
𝐻𝐴: (𝛽𝐶 + 2𝛽𝐶2 ∗ 𝐶) ∗
exp (𝑋𝛽)
{1 + exp(𝑋𝛽)}2
≠ 0, 𝑖𝑓 𝐶 > 9.09 
 
 Second, the probability that the confidence interval contains the true turning point 
for the population is 95%. Conversely, the probability that the right side of the upper 
limit includes the population parameter is only 2.5%. Also, the value of 9.09 has the p-
value of 0.051, which is calculated through the "display 2*ttail(285, 1.9597)" command 
in STATA. Therefore, any value higher than the upper limit is rejected as the true turning 
point for the population with low p-value (<0.05), and the upper limit is estimated as the 
turning point for the population. Given that only 3.8% of schools score 9.09 or above, 
Hypothesis 2 is supported at the 5% level.   
 
Testing Hypothesis 1 by using a Confidence Interval     
 Testing Hypothesis 1 is similar to testing Hypothesis 2. The null and the 
alternative hypothesis for testing Hypothesis 1 are as follows:  
 
𝐻0: (𝛽𝐶 + 2𝛽𝐶2 ∗ 𝐶) ∗
exp (𝑋𝛽)
{1 + exp(𝑋𝛽)}2
= 0, 𝑖𝑓 𝐶 < 4.44 
𝐻𝐴: (𝛽𝐶 + 2𝛽𝐶2 ∗ 𝐶) ∗
exp (𝑋𝛽)
{1 + exp(𝑋𝛽)}2
≠ 0, 𝑖𝑓 𝐶 < 4.44 
 
 The probability that the left side of the lower limit contains the true turning point 
is only 2.5%, and the p-value of the lower limit is also 0.051. So, more than one-third of 
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schools (𝐶 < 4.44) are encouraged to adopt an innovation by their poor performance, 
which is statistically significant at the 5% level. In addition, this study suggests 9.09 as 
the turning point for the population. Taken together, Hypothesis 1 is supported.  
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